

Speaker 1: [00:00:00](#) [inaudible]

Nick Burns: [00:00:00](#) but in essence

Speaker 1: [00:00:07](#) [inaudible] you want some water? [inaudible]

Nick Burns: [00:00:25](#) okay, welcome back. Welcome back everyone. I'm Nick Burns, executive director of the Aspen Security Forum. Welcome back. We have an all star panel of extraordinary, uh, depth and experience to talk about the other great power that came up in the last session. It's Russia, it's not China, but you'll remember yesterday and again today, both professor Joe and I, and I'm remarking that one of the hallmarks of president Trump's national security policy, and I agree with him on this, at least his administration, is that the greatest threat to the United States right now is the power of China and Russia. It's different. One is clearly ascending China. One may be descending over the longterm. But think about Vladimir Putin. He's the, he's the most experienced leader of a major country in the world today. He's 20 years in power. He's highly opportunistic. He still has nuclear weapons. His goal is to cut the United States down to sides.

Nick Burns: [00:01:27](#) We are still dealing with a peer competitor, at least in the transatlantic area, in the Middle East, and in strategic terms with Russia. Thomas Silvis far end of this to my right to your left, former president of our great ally, Estonia, former foreign minister of Estonia Estonia's first ambassador to the United States after the reassertion of Estonia's independence in 1991. And Tomas and I have worked very closely together for 25, 30 years on all of these issues. Victoria Nuland, uh, one of the truly outstanding American career diplomats of the last several decades, assistant secretary of State for Europe and Russia and Ukraine under President Obama, ambassador to NATO and acknowledged experts on these issues, tough as nails with the Russian Federation, if I can say that. And a close friend, Dr. Kathleen Hicks, senior vice president of CSS in Washington, occupant of the Henry Kissinger Chair, senior Defense Department official under President Obama. In my view, one of the smartest people in the United States on our national security and an American defense.

Nick Burns: [00:02:45](#) Very pleased to have her here and on my right, a renaissance man, a protean mayor, former acting director of the CIA, former deputy director of the CIA, former director of intelligence of the CIA, former director of Europe. As I remember John of the CIA when Toria and John and I were working together at the very end of the Cold War as the Soviet Union was crashing and

burning, John was leading the analytical effort in the United States government to make sense of this and to make sense of what would happen to an empire that's split into 15 states on December 25th, 1991 I should also tell you now, professor at my Alma Mater, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a semi-professional magician. So we've got a great panel here today.

Nick Burns: [00:03:44](#)

So, um, I'm going to ask each of them about a different challenge we have with Russia. And then we'll probably go a second round and then we're going to, I'm going to open it up to your questions and your comments, but let me just list, I just sat down right here and listed seven specific threats that Russian poses to the United States. I'll bet we could come up with double or triple that if I gave the panel five minutes. Threaten number one, Russia continues to threaten its neighbors occupying Georgia occupied in Ukraine, harassing Moldova, harassing Belle of Belarus, and Tom Tomas will tell us, threaten number two, trying to undermine seeking to undermine the Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland for NATO allies. Threatened number three, cath, we'll talk about it. Assault in our democracy. I just listened to the intelligence community on there. January 7th of 2017 report. I've read it and the Mueller report, there is no question.

Nick Burns: [00:04:45](#)

Russia not just intervened. They tried to smash our election in a variety of ways. Will they do it again in 2020 threat number four, which story is going to speak to Russia's essentially walking out of the treaty that President Reagan and President Gorbachev signed in December, 1990 87 the intermediate nuclear forces treaty, we've got big questions about whether arms control can continue threatened. Number five, Russia has replaced the United States as the most important power in certainly Syria and certainly Lebanon, and in terms of its relationship with Iran, that is a deficit for the United States is not additive. Threaten number six, Putin said at the Osaka Summit two weeks ago, the g 20 summit, he said this liberal order at the previous panel was discussing, he said, it's dead, Ronald Reagan's vision of America dead. John F Kennedy's vision dead and we're not punching back. That's threatened. Number six, we have no JFK or Reagan arguing that our democratic system of course is superior threat.

Nick Burns: [00:05:53](#)

Number seven he wants to cut us down to size and as Toria knows, he tries everything he can to do that. We've got a substantial competition underway with Russia. Tomas, let me, President Elvis, let me just ask you, you have lived your entire professional life and your personal story is remarkable and you

might want to just say how you got to Estonia from where and the lessons you've learned. What's it like to live next door to the Russian bear and can Estonia defend its independence and can we help you do that? Okay. Well, just briefly, as you can tell from my accent, my linguistically formative years were in New Jersey

Speaker 1: [00:06:42](#) [inaudible]

Toomas Ilves: [00:06:42](#) but, uh, I'm a child, the refugees, uh, I moved here actually, and unlike some other people, I did go back. Um, uh, but I worked for previous to becoming ambassador, I worked for 10 years at radio for Europe. Yeah. Um, now do we feel afraid? Uh, well, I mean it's paradoxical that in fact I would say the countries you mentioned, the ones where in NATO in the European Union are far more relaxed, uh, these days because the things that we have seen Russia do as in not only the United States, but also in western Europe. We've been living with for 25 years. One of my earliest experiences with President Clinton and the State Department was when Boris Yeltsin told an absolute lie about what we were doing in Estonia. I had to jump hoops. The US embassy had to jump hoops and we proved it. It was all wrong. It was a lie.

Toomas Ilves: [00:07:43](#) Um, but you know, we've been, so we've been facing this information from the get go even from before independence when they were trying to discredit the independence moon. So in many ways we're much more relaxed. I did spend a all my time until 2004 to get Estonia into the European Union and to NATO, uh, precisely for the reason that we see now, which is that unlike Ukraine or mold of a or Belarus or Georgia, uh, I mean, attacking us would have genuine consequences, real consequences. Whereas, uh, I mean there's kind of the, I'm going to receive the tepid response of the West to what they have done. For example, in Ukraine, um, on the part of none on the part of Western Europe. Let me see. Well, thank God we joined when we did. In fact, that was my own paranoia that, well, we have a window of opportunity.

Toomas Ilves: [00:08:41](#) We have to get in there, into those two organizations fast as possible. Now say the neighbors of Russia that are in the u n or NATO, I mean, Finland, the three Baltic countries, Poland, um, was, is there most of the other countries you kind of buffered, uh, have, uh, I mean the membership in those two organizations gives us a, a, a form of security or sense of security that at least allows us to breathe and not be worried. Uh, because we know that, that in fact we do have this, the NATO umbrella. We have the European Union Lisbon Treaty.

Uh, I call it the olive oil. Uh, the olive oil, uh, article 42 seven, which says that in case of an attack on an EU member than other, the other EU members are obligated to help, which in some cases might mean sending us olive oil. Um, but NATO, NATO is a different animal.

Toomas Ilves:

[00:09:47](#)

NATO's a different now, but it, cause I say that. So there is that different, but it's quite clear and I would end with this, that basically what we have been experiencing for all of these years, 28 years now, um, is now beginning to be experienced by western Europe. I would say as of 2014, 2015 it is no accident that the NATO cyber center is in Estonia and the NATO street stratcom center, which actually deals with countering propaganda. And this information is in Latvia because we had the experience with that and enough experience to actually go to the NATO saying, we think this is a problem. Whereas, um, and those were both set up before, uh, we saw the kind of actions that we have seen since, uh, Crimea basically directed towards the West.

Nick Burns:

[00:10:41](#)

Thank you. One of the questions that Tori and I get a lot, and we spoke together in Chicago a couple of months ago, we're both former ambassadors to NATO, is why did you expand NATO to the east, up to the Russian border since Donia didn't that drive Putin to be more aggressive? And the answer that I think that we both always give is we freed 100 million people in eastern Europe to live free lives in places like Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia. You can be sure the Russians would be back in if we weren't there. And that's my bylaw of question. Do you, Tomas, a year ago this week, they freed themselves. Let's put it that they freed themselves, that we secured it. That's right. Year ago, this week, the president was interviewed by Tucker Carlson, the night of his Helsinki summit with President Putin, Tucker Carlson said, why should we send young Americans to fight for NATO? Ally Montenegro and the president demured he did not say that he would support a NATO ally in an article five attack by Russia, specifically yen stolen Dork said yesterday. Tomas at deterrence rests on the ability of the rival to understand exactly what we're going to do. Do you think that our article five commitment to you in this is real?

Toomas Ilves:

[00:11:54](#)

Well, it's one reason why even before this administration, uh, as soon as actually shortly after we became president, I started pressuring the government to spend 2% to let take that off the table because you go to a percent of GDP on your percent of GDP on defense. Sorry. Yeah. It's kind of shorthand for NATO people. But, uh, because I could, you could already see that. I mean, Bob Gates said it and Hillary Clinton, it basically saying,

you know, if you guys don't, if these countries don't spend 2%, then we're going to lose a taste for NATO, which is why all three, actually the four countries you mentioned, the three Baltic countries and Poland all spent two, at least 2%. Yeah. Uh, on defense to take at least that issue off the table.

Nick Burns:

[00:12:41](#)

Um, Toria um, we are containing Russian power in eastern Europe, but since 1963 when president Kennedy negotiated the nuclear test ban treaty with Khrushchev, we've also been trying to limit the type and the number of quality of nuclear weapons to assure stability and to avoid nuclear Armageddon. Do you fear with the inf treaty President Reagan's treaty limiting intermediate missiles that's going off the books? August 2nd, there was a question whether the Trump administration wants to take off the Russian offer to extend newstart limits on strategic weapons. Do you fear that this era, more than 50 years of arms control, controlling nuclear weapons is coming to an end? And what kind of dangers are there for all of us?
[inaudible]

Victoria Nuland:

[00:13:25](#)

and add to that, that Russia also fell out of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty about 10 years ago. You were a negotiator. We tried to negotiate a way through that and, and we failed. Um, not that we think that the next battle will be reams of tanks, so we think it's more likely to be little green men and, and electricity turned off and that kind of thing. Uh, I worry about the way we have handled, uh, the Russian violations in the first instances in the Obama administration and, and now the, the decision by us to withdrawal because they are violating rather than to try to work our way back through and put counter pressure on them to stay in the treaty. And the reason the Trump administration is willing to let Russia out of the intermediate forces treaty is, and just to remind, this is a treaty from 1987 that banned weapons, medium range nuclear weapons.

Victoria Nuland:

[00:14:17](#)

We used to both have weapons, remember the Pershings in Germany and the Russians had hundreds of their own that could hit our European allies. And we're a potential point of black male one way or the other. Um, so the treaty from 1987 banned all of these weapons and they were all removed from the European theater. So we still have the long range weapons. We still have sea based and air based and all of those things. But this particular one, uh, disappeared until the Russians started violating the treaty about, uh, you know, five or six years ago. So now we're in a situation where Russia has missiles, once again, nuclear tipped missiles that it can fire from current sites that can hit Berlin and Paris, not to mention Estonia, the

short range missiles have always been there and we have not, uh, either put a sufficient cost on Russia to have them rethink, nor have we put in place sufficient countermeasures of our own that can serve as a deterrent to stop them from using them.

Victoria Nuland: [00:15:20](#)

And what I worry about is that President Trump, uh, appropriately feels much more secure now that there are the conventional forces of, of, uh, five, 10 NATO countries at a time in Estonia protecting your territory, working with you. But that wouldn't stop a Russia with medium range nukes from turning out the lights on Estonia, moving in when NATO didn't have enough force and saying we're going to keep this piece of territory and if you don't allow us to, we'll use this little nice nuclear set of weapons we have on Berlin. So the challenge for us is to get a conventional deterrence going and to get that going and to get it going in a sufficient manner such that the Russians rethink this what set of weapons altogether. So you could be talking about a medium range conventional weaponry that can take out the Russian nukes on the, on their launchers.

Victoria Nuland: [00:16:15](#)

You could, you're talking about missile defenses, these kinds of things. But right now we're only just starting a conversation about that in NATO. So for several years the Russians will have this advantage and now they are petitioning us to extend the reduction in long range weapons. The new start treaty that was negotiated under the Obama Administration. I personally believe that that is the right thing to do to extend and they want to extend it because they can't afford to build new long range nuclear weapons, but we shouldn't let them have it for nothing we should use and we can, if we need to, we should use this, um, demand and requirement that they have on the long range side to get them back into compliance with the INF and with a whole bunch of other, um, issues that we have concerns about that we're going to talk up, talk about here because they should fear that we will outpace them on the long range side if they're gonna play these kinds of games that can potentially threaten our allies and folks that we've pledged to defend.

Victoria Nuland: [00:17:15](#)

So that's what you think we should do. Um, what do you think that president Trump will do on the question of new start? Yeah. Well, first of all, the reason he's willing to get out of the media and medium range treaty is because he wants to build medium range weapons against China. And it was not, it was a, a global treaty that constrained both of us, so we could easily, not easily, but we could have gone to the Russians and said, let's maintain the medium range treaty via the European theater and work together on the threats coming from China, or at least not worry about China on the, on the long range side.

Um, I worry that the president doesn't believe in the successes of long range arms. I'm just control that he thinks that it's a useful for the United States. Also protect perhaps fees of each China to, to build more long range weapons and, and wants to spend the American tax payer money that way. So He's perfectly willing to let Russia do the same. And um, you know, we'll, we'll see.

Nick Burns: [00:18:14](#) We can come back to this and we will, but I have to go back to your, I just have to ask your opinion because you are a senior official until very recently, um, if, God forbid Estonia or Latvia, Lithuania or Poland were attacked by any means, electronic warfare, uh, conventional attack with this particular American president, stand up for them.

Victoria Nuland: [00:18:34](#) Okay. Well, I want to believe that there will be a big pressure from the American Congress that there will be big pressure from our allies to fulfill our treaty commitments. We have twice had enormous votes from the Congress and supportive NATO. And interestingly, among the American people, support for NATO and sport for the UN by the way, is on the rise because Americans don't want to go it alone. And they remember that it was NATO who came to our defense, uh, after September 11 either. But what I worry about is timing. I worry that too much territory will be seated. Uh, too much pressure will be put on these vulnerable allies and it will then take a lot more, uh, to put Russia pushed Russia back by the time we get our act together.

Toomas Ilves: [00:19:20](#) I would just interject what actually I am one more reason why I'm relaxed, at least on military attacks. I'll, I'll, we'll talk later about other things. But is that in fact, the entire Putin regime, uh, exists or I mean is, relies upon laundering their money in the west where it is safe. That, I mean, even putting, and why would you want to start a war or invade, uh, western Europe? I mean, okay, we could deal with us, but then that would put everything on hold and you'd probably have all of their things confiscated, but, but they don't really want to lose the west. It's much cheaper to threaten us. Or it's much cheaper to use a disinformation to change governments or get governments you like than it is to invade. And besides, you would lose your money and the billions and hundreds of billions of dollars that have been laundered out of Russia in the past 25 years, I mean, it would disappear. They don't want that. So

Victoria Nuland: [00:20:23](#) to continue that thought though, we have to be willing to use these kinds of asymmetric tools. You can't just have nukes for nukes. You have to be willing to say, okay, your access to our

banking system is ended if you threaten our allies. So there, you know,

Nick Burns: [00:20:36](#) so you've reassured us. It's the Tony Soprano mafia, like oligarchy of Russia, which is the real defender of Estonia. Yes. In that sense. So Kath Hicks is an on all these strategic, nuclear and conventional issues and she's free to say what she wishes here, but I also wanted you to comment cath on the new Russian threat that we saw materialize in the United States in 2016 the Netherlands, France, and Germany. And there are elections in 2017 in our midterms. And I just like you to talk about what you think is coming down the line. This is the asymmetric threat of cyber and social media. Sure. So

Kathleen Hicks: [00:21:12](#) to pick up where Tomas sort of left off, there was a whole suite of ways to undermine us centrus advanced Russian interests relative to the u s and its Western allies, um, that don't require combat forces, important to deter any possible thought about using combat forces. That's why we have a stepped up presence, um, in eastern Europe and more than that. Uh, but the real concern of what we've seen is that they have this suite of tools or many of them, one subset of them are around influence and information, um, enabled by cyber. Uh, and then one target set within that is elections. Right. Um, so I just want to set that context because it's, it's a very important subset and I'm going to focus on that, but it sits inside a whole bunch of other places. The Russians are going. So of course we know as you've already mentioned, uh, that the Russians are validated from our intelligence community as interfering the 2016 election in 2018 midterms.

Kathleen Hicks: [00:22:13](#) We have, uh, the director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats has come out and said very clearly that the Russians were engaged in temps to influence that election. Um, by the way, also where the Chinese and the Iranians according to, um, to de, to the DNI, then you fast forward to the EU parliamentary elections that have just happened there. There also was a statement from the EU that the Russians were seen to be interfering in a campaign, a sustained campaign to affect European elections. Um, and only days after that president Trump was asked if the g 20, uh, did he anticipate, what did he tell the Russians not to metal? He was sitting next to President [inaudible] near President Putin and he said, don't metal wagging his finger. Don't meddle in our elections, but in a tone that conveyed a valley of the [inaudible]. It was a lighthearted approach. Um, and I think this is the real challenge that we face going into 2020, right, which is, it's, it's now an accepted fact.

Kathleen Hicks: [00:23:10](#) And in fact, the FBI director has already said that they are engaged in operations aimed at the 2020 election. The president seems to be tacitly acknowledging it, but we're down to meddling and you know, boys will be boys behavior or something of that sort. And in fact, what we're really seeing is more what the EU is pointed to was sustained deliberate attack to undermine the vital interest, the poor vital interest of democratic society. And in the United States, the core tenants of our constitution, there is nothing more central to our security, right, than the strength and vitality of our and elections are one piece, one piece, major piece of that. So there's no doubt that they're a after it. Why are they after it? I think it's been well-stated, it's cheap. Uh, we have lots of problems internally that they can exploit. As a matter of fact, a lot of what they do now is really, uh, build off of narratives that are already out there, left versus right.

Kathleen Hicks: [00:24:05](#) For instance, particular groups on particular issues. They're just building off of those divisions through social media exploitation, um, and trying to ramp them up. In fact, in the 2016 election, there were instances that were on earth of them are bringing together, they amped up both sides of issue of an issue and brought them together physically in one location. Hope in hopes of starting a brawl. Um, so the outcome more than anything is to devalue our system and bring chaos. And we are not prepared for 2020. We have a limited amount of investment at the federal government level. States are in all different, um, state, state of readiness. Um, and I think there's much more we could do systematically both to shore up the American public to start to have the media literacy and the civics knowledge, if you will, in the longterm to be stronger as a democracy. And then in the really near term to have the tools of strategic narrative and counter dis information vests that appropriately and the agents of the federal government. So for instance, Department of Homeland Security, um, and move out quickly. That is not where we are today.

Nick Burns: [00:25:10](#) So, um, what should the executive branch do? What should congress do to work with the 50 states, which control elections in the United States to raise our defenses? And why haven't we had a bigger national effort?

Kathleen Hicks: [00:25:23](#) And I get, I think it's because it's, we're in a strange state of suspended reality where very little is moving in general in terms of legislative priorities of course. So this is one of those and there is sort of an acceptance of the fact that there is the threat. But of course, it's been highly politicized in the u s system. Right? So, uh, going after issues of election interference seems

to mean, uh, indicating that the Russians delivered Trump an election or giving some kind of credence to a particular partisan viewpoint. So I think we've had a lot of difficulty separating this issue of foreign election interference from the political fights that we are having. And again, the Russians are helping that by exploiting it. I mentioned before other parties are involved that may be part of the solution to help galvanize action. Um, you know, the Chinese, the Iranians and the Russians and they will have different interests and there'll be going in different directions.

Kathleen Hicks: [00:26:17](#) I think that's something that can, you can get more, um, energy around then we had in investigating, if you will in 2016. So some of the things that can happen, I mentioned DHS has an, uh, an election, um, security task force. I think Congress should be authorizing and appropriating to that task force, um, to have Brandt making, that's first of all the resources to sustain professional staff and execute the mission across 50 states. And then to have a grant making process that, um, delivers the kinds of capabilities that are most important to the state. So those could be conditional grants that are targeted at specific cyber protection approaches. Um, I think it also requires, of course a narrative shift that's not going to happen, I think with the president. So the question is, are there other major speakers, whether are leaders inside government, whether in the legislative branch and or in the executive branch who are going to start talking to the American people about disinformation as a real threat.

Nick Burns: [00:27:16](#) But the senator majority leader just blocked legislation on improving elections, et Cetera, to McConnell. Yeah,

Kathleen Hicks: [00:27:23](#) these are, these are difficult times, but that's what it takes. I think you have to have a conversation with the American people about how to understand when they're being fed lies, how to create trusted sources of information. Um, and that requires a trust in those sources, whether that's government or media. Um, and that's a longer term solution than I think we're going to get by 2020. So I think what we need to do by 2020 is really try to invest those dollars in the cyber defense side of it. Uh, which I think is more tractable, if you will, in terms of it being a technical issue rather than a political issue. And I think those who are able to speak in as bipartisan or nonpartisan away as can be heard, they, they need to be speaking up now about the importance of this issue.

Nick Burns: [00:28:08](#) You spent your whole life thinking about how to defend the United States from a country like Russia earlier. It was the hard,

it was the arms strategic and tactical arms. Now it's the soft underbelly belly of Mars cyber system. Is this the more immediate threat right now than the nuclear weapons? Of course they're both important. But where would you put your attention first?

Kathleen Hicks: [00:28:30](#)

Well, I think I put it this way. On the nuclear weapons side, we have, um, a way of thinking through that we have expertise, we have capability existence, we have a nuclear triad for instance. Um, and so I think we can, uh, spend less relative leadership energy, making sure we're keeping that sustained important as it is. And I do think we have important gaps on conventional forces, which I'm not here to talk about today. That's a whole other topic. But I don't want to let that go by. This is absolutely the smartest, cheapest way to go with the United States right now. And we should go at us. Yeah. Do we should be just as smart as an adversary. You build off your strengths. Do you limit your vulnerabilities? We're not doing either right now our strengths or alliances leveraging an innovative private sector and our democracy and all three of those, we are not fully leveraging. And in fact, we are taking in some cases, uh, actions that diminish those advantages even as we're not really sure enough those vulnerabilities. So for instance, on cyber,

Nick Burns: [00:29:31](#)

thank you. Let me tell you, you should just think of it as a two step process. I mean, for example, giving 9 million euros to marine Le Pen, which they did Putin, Putin. Yeah. Uh, I mean who's [inaudible] and

Toomas Ilves: [00:29:42](#)

Marine Le Pen's position was to pull France out of NATO. Now if you can sort of use their Rumsfeldian desegregate Europe or this aggregate NATO, then then all of the military options become really worrisome. As long as you can keep these, these, uh, entities alive and work and functioning. Um, well then we can rest easy. But you see the effort is everywhere. Promoting anti EU forces everywhere, promoting anti NATO forces and doing it not only through social media but also through bribes and money. And we just saw, you know, Salvini in Italy being, I mean, these embarrassing tapes and we'll see what happens with it. I mean all of this, I mean they are focused on supporting anti EU anti NATO forces in every country of those organizations.

Nick Burns: [00:30:33](#)

Thank you. John, you have spent your professional life as an intelligence analyst, intelligence officer, thinking about the rival, trying to get into the head, the mindset of the rival. If you would just give us a sense of what you think Putin is trying to do vis-a-vis us calf has given us a very palpable sense of what he's trying

to do. Concrete sense, could you explain that? Assess Russia's power. I think Joe is right that over time, the next several decades, Russia will decline, but right now pretty considerable power. And the third I'm going to add to the difficulty. Why is president Trump's so obsessed with his personal relationship with Trump, with Putin? And why is he not, he seems to be closer to Putin than he is to Merkel, which is an upside down American way of looking at the world.

John McLaughlin: [00:31:23](#)

Wow. Those are tough questions. Um, let me start this way by saying that, uh, you know, I was walking down the street in Moscow about six months ago with the veteran foreign service officers, someone known to the State Department people here. Uh, and he turned to me and said, you know, uh, [inaudible] we say this is a declining power. We say it has an economy about the size of Portugal, but they keep showing up. And what he meant was exactly that. They are a factor. They are always here. They're always a country. We have to take cognizant stuff. Uh, I mean I'll work toward your question, but thinking also that we have to figure out how we want to think about Russia and we have to communicate with them. Uh, when I was there six months ago, I came away with the sense that our official communication with Russian Russia has never been lower.

John McLaughlin: [00:32:28](#)

Our ambassador did not have good access. Uh, we are P and g that is sending home their people and they're sending home hours. And uh, I recall a, when, you know, you and I were working on this nick and Toria when there was a robust interchange, he particularly about the things you strongly deferred on, right? So if you're not communicating with them, you're both sort of operating in the dark. That's the first thought. The second thought is people go around saying, this is a new cold war. I think that's a very misleading metaphor. Why? Well, you know, we're kind of nostalgic about the Cold War. It was so clear, but also the Cold War had an imaginable end. It was a global struggle between two powers and one of them went away and we won definitively. Russia isn't going away, so it's going to be here. It's going to be a factor.

John McLaughlin: [00:33:31](#)

We're going to have to deal with it. What's he trying to do with us? I think Putin has four major objectives, uh, and we're among them. First. He wants iron control at home on challenged control at home. Uh, when I was there last time I spoke with a prominent businessman who spent his last 25 years, uh, in Russia, not an American, but an ally from an allied country. And he said to me, you, you know what the PR, the, the social contract is here. Stay out of politics and you can have a good life. Because I was remarking, I think that as I walked around

Russia in particular, you would see the same thing in some of the other major cities. It looks good. The cafes are full, even the bookshops are full. But, uh, stay out of politics and you can have a nice, nice life. Your second objective is to exert influence, strong influence in the countries that once were part of the Soviet Union. Now, I don't think he's trying to remake the Soviet Union. You know, people go around quoting him as having said, uh, the greatest tragedy in human history was the breakup of the Soviet Union. There's a lesser known Putin quote, which I almost never here, which is those who do not miss the Soviet Union have no heart. Those who miss it have no brain.

John McLaughlin:

[00:35:01](#)

So, you know, I think he's a realist. Uh, I don't think he wants to recreate that, but he certainly wants to have iron control or not. He wants to have influence in the areas around third, he wants to weaken our relationships with our allies, not just our NATO allies, but our EU allies and bilateral allies and forth. He wants to restore Russia's influence and other parts of the world. I would say from roughly 2012 when he became president again, Putin went global. Uh, up til then, his mischief was mostly in the area around Russia, the what we call the near abroad. Now Syria is the leading most visible example, but Russia is also active in Africa, Middle East, a little harder in Asia, although closely working with China. That's a whole other subject that we need to think about. So with us, the way I think about it is imagine a dinner party and we're at the adult table.

John McLaughlin:

[00:36:07](#)

He's over at the children's table. He's wants to saw the legs off our table. And one way to do that is to diminish our democracy. Another way to do that is to drive wedges between us and our allies and to weaken our alliances. Because in the world we're going into where we're dealing with pure competitors and a truly rising power in China, the force multiplier for us will be our alliances. We won't be able to spend our way to superiority as we have some times in the past. So our alliances are critical here and he wants to weaken them. And, um, I, I think his objectives are, are relatively clear now. What motivates him? What motivates Russia? Well, you know, Churchill couldn't figure it out. Uh, you know, his famous remark about a riddle inside a mystery, inside an enigma. So those are people who've worked on Russia.

John McLaughlin:

[00:37:02](#)

I think particularly Tory. I don't know whether you would agree, but spent your good part of your life on Russia. It's really hard to figure out at the core what is it that drives them? I think right now it's two things, uh, insecurity and uh, and a desire to broaden, make Russia make Russia great again, for lack of a better way to put it. Why the insecurity? Well, Russians will say

they never felt more secure than during the Cold War because they had two buffers around them. They had the east European satellites and they had the inner buffer of the other republics of the Soviet Union. Now, there's not criticizing our policy because I agree with what Nick said about the benefits of enlarging NATO, but now they don't have those buffers. They don't have the satellites that they don't have the republics that once were part of the Soviet Union.

John McLaughlin:

[00:38:05](#)

Uh, and when you say to them, why are you interfering with NATO? They're blind back to you is why did you put NATO on our border? Well, we understand that we didn't put it on their border to threaten them, but I think we need to understand also they do feel insecure and when countries are insecure, they do strange and dangerous things. So again, I go back to maybe my first point. It's important that we neither demonize Russia nor cut it off. We need to understand it, we need to communicate with it and we're not going to make it go away. Our strategy I think should be to put limits on what it can do to limit that. And I, I'm going to stop now because I was about to launch into a discussion of intelligence, which is a, that's a whole other subject. What is their intelligence effort and cath covered some of that.

John McLaughlin:

[00:38:58](#)

But in the intelligence realm for example, it means we need a really robust counter-intelligence effort. We have one, but it needs to be an area into which we put enormous resources to make sure that we understand. After all, the magnitude of their effort is signaled by the fact that we were able to send home 60 intelligence officers in March. That's a lot of intelligence officers that, I mean we are their number one target. We kicked them out, we kicked them out, we were PNG them persona non grata. This was in response to particularly the poisoning of scribble, scribble, scribble in the UK along with many other, many of our allies. But 60 that's a lot. So there are efforts against us on the intelligence side is roughly what it was during the Cold War. So we are the number one target. So it's a complicated problem and they are an adversary. I think we need to deal with them smartly,

Nick Burns:

[00:39:56](#)

John 30 seconds because it's a very relevant issue and I think it's confused. Teresa May, Emmanuel macro, Angela Merkel, why is the president unfailingly uncritical of Bladimir pood and yet incessantly critical of the Democratic leaders if they know it is happening, they're pulling away from us because of it. Why is he doing this? Well, there's [inaudible]

John McLaughlin: [00:40:20](#) that the \$64,000 question. And, uh, if I knew it, my name would probably be Robert Mueller. I don't know.

Nick Burns: [00:40:26](#) Sure. [inaudible]. Oh, say more. [inaudible]

John McLaughlin: [00:40:33](#) well, I'm not sure that a Bob Mahler really knows exactly the answer to that question. I think he was striving to figure it out. Uh, my, you know, everyone, anyone here any American could answer that question. We all see the same thing with the president. My hunch is he finds autocratic leaders simpatico. He admires the fact that they have this unchallenged control over so many aspects of their country. If this is a president who's talking about fake news and the media being the enemy of the people, well, uh, that's not a problem Putin has. And it's clearly something that, uh, eats away at this president. So I think he looks at them with a certain amount of envy. I'm sad to say that'd be my best guess. I, I can't sit here and tell you because I used to work on intelligence that he's an asset of the America of the Russian intelligence service. No one knows that. I don't, I would not say that. I think that's almost too simplistic. I think he just admires that type of governance.

Nick Burns: [00:41:46](#) So, um, before we go to questions, Tomas Toria Cath, um, if you were advising president Trump, secretary pump peo in terms of rebalancing this relationship with Russia being very tough where he must, but I think taking John's admonition, which two diplomats here should win, we'd certainly believe in, don't we need a closer dialogue to avoid the condom mistakes that Joe talked about on the first panel this afternoon. And then John has talked about,

John McLaughlin: [00:42:13](#) I would say that, um, yet, I mean there's a,

Toomas Ilves: [00:42:16](#) you have to be consistent. There's a better Germany where concept fent but that is just, I mean, stick to your policy, Eh, because I have a feeling that that in, uh, in the wake of the script ball thing, he's just waiting us out and you see one by one they're going on. Wow. You know, okay, we did that, but maybe, you know, it'd be nice to do something. Um, and to get started again, this, this perennial push to, to maintain sanctions that were adopted after the, uh, the annexation of Crimea and mh 17. Yesterday. It was the five year anniversary of that horrible crime. I mean, it's, you know, there's now this building pressure, getting all, let's well, okay, let's bygones be bygones. And for, for from his perspective, I mean, having already been there, as you said, for 20 years, it's like, well, I'm gonna wait around another two years and then everything would go back to normal.

Toomas Ilves: [00:43:11](#) We've seen it with the U K numerous times. We're still in the script postscript ball phase right now. But how long is that gonna last? I mean, red had in Yanko I British subject murdered on British territory, I mean in London, yet Mel then is an eased up. I mean, so you get over the initial, uh, outrage and then, uh, pretty soon things are moving, you know, and then you have, you see movement in a number of countries in Europe, even among East European countries saying, well, you know, it's not so bad and maybe we can just sort of, um, and find a modus vivendi. And then you can do, I mean, so that's, I think what he's waiting for. And I would say just if you make a decision, stick to it.

John McLaughlin: [00:43:57](#) Thank you Tori.

Victoria Nuland: [00:43:59](#) Look, I, since 1948, the u s has re has led the allied family in our comprehensive approach to first the Soviet Union and then Russia. And we are not doing that any more. We have this whole panoply of issues from defending democracy to arms control, to their use of dirty money throughout our economic system, etc. Uh, that we ought to be addressing. But at the same time, we ought to be playing for a better Russia as Ronald Reagan did. Uh, and he was constantly appealing over the heads of bad Soviet to the Russian people. Um, and I actually think that at home Putin's model is beginning to fail. He, you know, the compact he has with his people, you stay out of politics and the chicken in your pot will get fatter every year. He can't deliver anymore because he hasn't made the investments in Russia itself. And when you look at polling in Russia, what do they care about most now?

Victoria Nuland: [00:44:53](#) Not The glory of Ukraine or the glory of Syria or the glory of messing with our elections, but the fact that there are hospitals don't work, that their roads are broken down, that you have to bribe your way to get into university, et cetera. So I actually think we've got a, of, if we were to put ourselves together with allies and raise the cost, uh, to Putin for messing with both our democratic systems, for breaking global norms that he has previously agreed to, but also at the same time offer the Russian people a better deal, you know, come back into the family of European nations and here are the economic benefits. Here are the trade deals that we could conceivably do. Here is the travel and this kind of thing. What does Putin given you? He's given you a false empty glory and try to try to get back to that kind of a conversation in terms of having, um, diplomatic dialogue.

Victoria Nuland: [00:45:51](#) I agree with John that, that, you know, we used to have channels, rich channels at every level with every admin. Um, you know, a ministry of the Russian government, which would come together at the presidency. I remember when I was on the ground in Moscow and you were at the NSC and we would talk about trying to get all the pieces together. Um, when the president's not leading a comprehensive policy, that's very difficult to do. But on the Russian side as Putin has, you know, made his own vertical of power tighter and tighter. He doesn't trust anybody to negotiate anything. And so you can have these conversations. Our, our colleague Jim Jeffries, having conversations every week with his buddy on Syria, but that doesn't mean that guy is allowed to make any decisions. Um, so it's also a function of, of Putin's level of control, which was why talking right to Russians about a better deal is needs to be part of the mix.

Victoria Nuland: [00:46:45](#) Small interdiction though. I mean, he was on a downhill road in 2014 and then he used Crimea to build up this huge Jingo wish that, you know, cry me his hours. And I guess one of the little things I worry about is trying sort of doing a Crimea redux at the next one. If we can again get everyone just love me again because I brought something back to the quality of Russia but I'm not sure it works anymore in this calculus where before we go to questions. Yeah, I was just going to add in and because I agree with everything that's been said, I'll start the end with be a better model, be a stronger alternative so that the Russians actually believe that yeah, they'd want to have a society like ours. So have a lot of work to do

Kathleen Hicks: [00:47:30](#) here. But then you asked explicitly for areas to work together and Tory has mentioned one very clear one which is new start on strategic arms control. Arms talks have been a very strong positive place for Americans and Russians to move the relationship and positive directions. I think we should be engaged in that. There are some other spaces, Syria, but not so much political resolution of Syria, but deconfliction military deconfliction in Syria I think is one that is um, making some progress or is at least at a level that you can expect a certain advantages from that conversation that protects lives. Um, that's no small thing. I think civil space is another, and then I think probably on the more questionable side, but maybe worth a try is on the architect.

Nick Burns: [00:48:16](#) Yeah. I would just suggest as we go to questions, um, we're fighting a battle of ideas with Russia and China. They are a very system and maybe MBS and aired one. They're all basically saying the authoritarian model is a superior model to our model

and think of the big moments of the Cold War. Really nothing to do with nuclear weapons. With Kennedy at the Berlin Wall in 1963, Reagan at the same wall, different part of the wall in the 87 asserting our model, what we believe. And that's a, that's something that we can control, but we don't have the presidents not prepared to do that. His successors should questions, comments for this fantastic group, John Scarlet of the United Kingdom, who knows a little bit about Russia?

- Speaker 7: [00:49:02](#) Well, um, if I some a comment and then a basic question. Uh, obviously, um, taking account of our recent experience cause we been on the front line, uh, somewhat in this area. Um, you haven't quite mentioned when you're talking about the motivation and mindset for Levemir Putin that he lived through personally very directly, the humiliation of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yeah. Uh, and, um, that, you know, people at that generation don't forget it. So it's just there and the course. It creates a sense of insecurity and resentment. And, uh,
- Nick Burns: [00:49:43](#) John, just so people here know what, you know, Putin was an intelligence officer in, in East Germany, had to burn the files and basically closed down shop as,
- Speaker 7: [00:49:52](#) as he, well, he was, he was an officer. He was turning colonel briefly, I think people left and cut on in the Leningrad KGB, uh, in dressing. That's right. Uh, W, which was not a top career job in, uh, in, uh, in the old KGB wasn't even in the federal KGB or the center. So, you know, there's a tendency to exaggerate his KGB, um, experience. There's also a deficiency a bit like that in, in those days. So still it's, so the humiliation, the sense of it is just a KGB sense. It's a, I would say, uh, you know, somebody from that generation who was a loyal Soviet, uh, and put, so we have to understand that. Now it seems to me we haven't quite onset the difficult question that we have before us because I mean comments had been made, which I'm any people like me very strongly support that is dangerous not to have good contact and good, uh, good dialogue and effective dialogue and channels and so on with, um, uh, a regime that, that kind, how do you do that when it behaves in the way it does and it carries on behaving in a way it does.
- Speaker 7: [00:51:03](#) Um, obviously the particular issue of scrip owl most recently, it's not true by the way, that nothing much happened after the [inaudible] and co a lot. Yes, it did. Um, in fact, we, um, uh, broke off, uh, effective relations with them in a whole number of areas and we haven't restored them. So we need to be, we need to be clear about that. So, but all the same, we haven't, we haven't quite sort of worked out how do we manage that

balance between, on the one hand, you know, responding to the vicious behavior, which was completely outrageous, obviously around script Powell the same time finding ways of talking to each other.

Nick Burns: [00:51:42](#) So let me do this. I, I, since we want to get a lot of questions, I may want to just ask John and Toria to take this one because you both had to deal with this question. How do we compete and yet communicate so that we don't get into a situation that's dangerous? Well,

John McLaughlin: [00:51:56](#) sir, John puts his finger on an important point and I agree with what Toria said about the difficulty of dialogue. Uh, going back to this trip I mentioned, we spoke with people who work on arms control, uh, in professional people in the Russian, uh, ministries and, uh, and they were not getting any encouragement from Putin. Uh, they were quite depressed about it to, to reignite an arms control dialogue. So what Toria said about the difficulty of having a dialog is true. That said, I still think it's worth talking to them, but with this caveat, in my personal experience, it's very important to be candid and direct with the Russians. Yeah. Very important to be candid and direct, including when you know, they are allying to you. Uh, I recall sitting in the, uh, uh, in, in a building and it actually in Moscow and in a consultation in which for a variety of reasons, I knew they were just telling me flat out lies. You can't tell them how you know, but you have to challenge them and say, we know that's not correct. We know that is wrong. We know that for certain. Now will they admit they're wrong? Well, they admit that. No, but it's important that they know, you know, because it, that changes the dialogue a little bit. It starts to get it on some plane where you're not quite communicating, but you're getting closer that way. And uh, that's thought I have about

Speaker 8: [00:53:26](#) it. Um, that's not perfect, but it's better than nothing.

Victoria Nuland: [00:53:32](#) In the old days did, they actually would very rarely lie to your face because I didn't want to lose credibility. They might not fully disclose x or y, but nowadays the diplomatic lying is another form of disinformation. So you have to go into it very, very well informed. Um, but you still have this problem of whether the interlock at or below the level of Putin has any power. I did six rounds with his appointed, um, presidential administration guy on Ukraine in, in 2015 and 16. And we, to the extent we made progress, it was only because Papa Putin was watching on a daily basis. Uh, but it was limited, let's put it that way. Ah, look, I think going back to the point of wrapping ourselves in our allied family, we have to be very clear that we

will raise the costs regularly and painfully on bad behavior and on things that are dangerous to our way of life and our security and our economy and our democracy if they continue.

Victoria Nuland:

[00:54:38](#)

But there will also be benefits in the form of sanctions coming off. Market's opening a better relationship with us coming back into the European family and benefiting from prosperity and spending less money on weapons if they're willing to cut deals. I think we've made a mistake getting to stove-piped Syria for Syria, arms control for arms control, uh, money for money. We need to put it all in a single package. And I also think that we're not doing as well, including on the intelligence side of looking at the full range of tools that we have, particularly the economic tools. I mean, why after screen Paul and after continued election interference in 2018 all across the transatlantic space, Europe and the United States, can Russia still float? It's sovereign bonds in the European market? I mean that is absurd. So we have tools like that. We have tools in terms of exposing how Putin rips off his own citizens and pockets the money and hides it in our banks that we could be pushing back into Russia. So we're, we're just, uh, we need to pull the family together. We need to make cost-benefit, uh, very clear and we need to, um, be, as you said, nick, very, very strong in the, um, benefits of our way of living, including for Russian people versus what he's offering.

Audience Member:

[00:56:04](#)

Yup. Um, let's take, thank you. Toria let's take two questions together. First is here and the second is ambassadors to Bernstein here. Hi, my name is Vanessa Norman. I'm the ambassador for Hong Guido, the Venezuelan, uh, to the UK. Um, and amongst, in the list of threats, Russia is of course crushing us, is literally causing the biggest humanitarian crisis the western hemisphere has ever seen. And using my country to, to, uh, as, uh, you know, his personal little prime. Sanjay, um, I'm interested in hearing your thoughts of this panel on how to counter Russia in Latin America, in Venezuela, Guam, Nicaragua, and um, the threats that that poses to US interests. And as you may recall, prior to this, we were great allies of the United States.

Nick Burns:

[00:56:55](#)

Thank you. Um, we'll take that question. It's too, why don't you ask your question now.

Audience Member:

[00:56:59](#)

You touched on it a minute. Fabulous panel. Uh, Putin we know is the richest man in the world and all the Allah guards are harboring, bring all, has all his money here in America. How will that play into how he reacts with,

Nick Burns: [00:57:15](#) Does uh, who would like to take Venezuela? Let's just limit it to Venezuela rather than expanded to Cuba, which is the can of worms. Russian involvement in Venezuela, which appears John,

John McLaughlin: [00:57:27](#) well the, they, they are exploiting Venezuela as the ambassador nose, uh, at first offering assistance. But in return for oil concessions and other things basically sucking everything out, they can. Um, the only way to answer your question is with, um, u s leadership in terms of engaging the rest of Latin America to, uh, oppose what is going on in Venezuela and to assist Venezuela, uh, with its humanitarian issues and, uh, and to basically enforce a doctrine that we once called the Monroe doctrine and try and chase food not of the hemisphere. I think the problem is, uh, it's not going to go to a military confrontation. Our, our conventional power, our nuclear power does not come much into play here. So it comes down really, uh, to diplomacy and to sanctions and, and such. And those instruments are there. And more broadly, um, one of the things we really haven't talked about here, but more broadly, and I would embed Venezuela in this, are combating Russian influence and efforts. Depends on the strength of our leadership in the world. That is, if we are not leading, and that's a whole separate conversation, but present, diplomatically robust and pushing everywhere, engaging. Um, and we're not right now things like this happen. And, and, uh, as I said, Putin went global roughly in 2012. And Venezuela, I'm sorry to say is one of the [inaudible].

Victoria Nuland: [00:59:04](#) Can I just a tactical asterisk on this one without solving the Venezuela problem? Um, I think we could do a lot more to educate the Venezuelan people on how the Russian relationship is ripping them off. That this is not something that Moscow is doing for the generosity of spirit, that the, is that it is all about

Toomas Ilves: [00:59:22](#) sucking Venezuela dry and oil and all of these kinds of things. And we don't get that word out. Uh, strongly enough. Tomas and Cath, um, stew ambassador Bernstein's question on the oligarchy. Oh, I'll give you a simple, a simple solution that should be followed not only by the United States, but also by a number of our allies that don't do this either, which is eliminate the possibility of buying property, uh, through an anonymous shell companies. Yes. I mean, we know the case of the man who led the Duma action on forbidding adoption beginning with a k, I forgot his name at the time, owned a two point \$9 million condo in Miami. We know that the constant [inaudible] of the semi on Maga leverage the godfather of Russia. I mean the, the above the mafiosi is constant Yeti, but apartments in Trump

tower, this is only possible through anonymous allowing anonymous shell companies to buy property.

Toomas Ilves:

[01:00:24](#)

Now we were paranoid in my country. Uh, we don't allow a shell company. You have to, you have to be, we have to know who's on the board. Uh, well we were paranoid because we're right next to the country. So we, we took, undertook certain actions that I think that everyone needs to take and the UK needs to take and I'll be France needs to take because that is what enables them to, to like to live the way there, not simply money laundering, uh, or it's indirect money laundering cause they have illicit money but with which they buy property and no one knows who's the real owner. And then you find out that, well there's this person living there. And I would say that would be a one simple solution, you know, that would really sort of dampen down all of this. Thank you. Kay.

Kathleen Hicks:

[01:01:09](#)

Yeah, I mean I just would play further on the overall point on transparency on your manual mentioned it this morning in the panel in the context of China and in general for Authoritarians, you know, transparency is Kryptonite and I think this is a great example. It's not the only one. I think to the extent that you can reveal, make clear this by the way, fix American oligarchs as well. Uh, where our money is going, where it's, what it's sources, whether it's in social media or whether it's in investments in, in, in, um, real estate or whatever it is. I think that will help very much a democratic society strengthen themselves, um, make themselves less vulnerable to accusations of being on the same playing field with, with, with the autocracies and it hurts, it hurts them. I want to mention one other thing just cause it hasn't really come up.

Kathleen Hicks:

[01:01:58](#)

We have a lot of inducement tools. We are not tapping. It's sort of touches on John mentioning before some of the, some of the work done during the Cold War. Yes, we can get better at economic transparency, regulation and coercion. Um, and filling out our toolkit beyond the military piece that we love to use so much, but we also have a huge advantage in terms of being able to tap into inducements. Information sharing is an inducement. Building alliances and partnerships through security cooperation is an inducement, but then there's like real money and do cements with the private sector, getting them into innovation, let's say on election security, let's say in R and D areas that are important to national security and with those abroad so that we're, we're creating the field we want to play on not playing on their field.

- Nick Burns: [01:02:42](#) Thank you very much. I'm a baseball fan. We're going to go into extra innings. We're going to take one more question right over here. Right over here at the very edge of the room. The woman with her hand up. Yeah, and then we'll take a break after this question and answer. We'll come back in 10 minutes for Secretary of State Albright.
- Kathleen Hicks: [01:03:00](#) Thank you. I'm Jennifer Glass from AI to zero. I'm wondering how much of this we've brought on ourselves by allowing Russia to take Crimea with, with what seemed like minimal sanctions. He used it to pioneer his hybrid warfare. He didn't just bring his own special forces in. There were also these militias that were, they're acting as private citizens. They were actually basically people straight out of central casting on the streets of Sevastopol and Zinpro people saying that they were all for this. And now he's done the same thing in Syria. And, and now they're actually publicly talking. His generals are publicly talking about this doctrine. How much, how much have we learned from that? How much, you know, can we prevent it? Um, and Victoria, to your point about talking directly to the Russian people, I mean, even in Crimea, in 2014 the Russians were hearing something totally different than what the rest of the world were hearing because they controlled all of the media allies.
- Nick Burns: [01:03:56](#) Thank you. It is important to remember the United States did not have in 2014 does not have in 2019 a security obligation to defend Ukraine is people are territory. It's never existed. Ukraine is not a member of NATO. Victoria was there, uh, there and in the aftermath, why don't you take this one? There is no security. No, there were security assurance has given to Ukraine on December 7th, 1995 that, but they do not amount to a NATO like protection. In the case of military attack, the Ukrainians knew that when they signed that 1995 document with President Clinton, Tory and I think were in the room for that assignment. Please,
- Victoria Nuland: [01:04:37](#) uh, look, this is this, we could have a whole nother panel and we should some day, I think we did last year maybe. Um, Crimea was very difficult cause it went very, very quickly and it was very, it would have been very hard for anybody to defend or, or pushback and frankly, no western government was standing up and saying, I'm gonna win back several people. I, I do think that when they moved on Donbass it was a slower roll and we were not quick enough either to raise the costs or to get, um, more military support into the Ukrainian people. There were a lot of reasons for that too. I still think that Putin old, you know, we've allowed Putin to just sit on that because the, the, the terms of

stalling haven't cost him very much. So you know, that said, the best thing we can do for the people of Ukraine is support the strength and independence and clean governance and prosperity of the other 93% of Ukraine, which by the way, if they succeed, we'll set a very complicated example for Putin's Russia, which doesn't have the same liberties or the same opportunities because of the way Putin has governed

John McLaughlin:

[01:05:51](#)

would just add. However, I don't think it has been sufficiently impressed upon sort of the nuclear powers that allowing, I mean the violation of an agreement that got rid of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, in return for a guarantee of territory. Maintaining the territorial integrity renders the NPT dead. Yeah. And I don't see how a North Korea or whoever decides to now develop nuclear weapons would ever accept the deal like that because they'd go, what do you mean? We know you got rid of the nuclear weapons. They, their territorial integrity has gone. Uh, and I think that's the broader implication and this, that will last for decades. We have to take what we can for the future. Out of this would be the way I'd answer it. You can't look backward looking to the future. The big lesson out of Ukraine is that we are going to go into the gray zone now and just, I recommend you all look at the CSIS website at some point.

John McLaughlin:

[01:06:52](#)

She's just published it. I'll pay you now. Okay. She's just published a really impressive study on how to think about gray zone warfare, which is not what we're used to. Big important powers like us, don't like to do sneaky stuff like that. My old agency of course is an exception, but big important powers. We have strong conventional power, nuclear power. That's not the card he's playing. And, uh, and we have, we have, in fact, I had a, I had the lesson of this red to me by one of our, uh, counterpart and Latvia of all places who said to me, the lesson out of Crimea is we must not allow a situation of ambiguity to develop, which is what happened. Cause for a long time we were saying what's going on there? It became apparent. And then, but that's the big lesson I think. So we'll be back in this room in 10 minutes to hear Secretary Albright. But please join me in thanking Thomas Hill

Speaker 1:

[01:07:48](#)

the story of new tactic. Jonathan.