

The View from the Hill: Protecting Liberal Values with Digital Tools

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00:03: Hi, David. Welcome back.

00:03: Hey. How are you, Anja?

00:05: Thanks, I'm fine. Thank you for moderating another session. Senator Warner, let me just do a quick introduction, not that you need it, for all our viewers. Senator Warner, of course, was elected to the US Senate in November 2008, from the great state of Virginia. He serves both on the Senate Finance and Banking and Budget Committees and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, two of our most critical committees. He also is a former venture capitalist, and with that, really the foremost thinker on technology and innovation and technology and national security in the US Senate. Senator Warner, we are very grateful to have you there as an expert on all of these technical issues, which are really coming to the forefront.

00:52: David Sanger is with us. He is a Senior National Security Correspondent for the New York Times. The man has won multiple Pulitzer Prizes and is a true expert in all things cybersecurity, technology and national security, so we can't imagine a better moderator for this session.

01:13: Senator Warner, I'm going to kick it over to David in a second, but... And I know he has a lot of questions he wants to ask you about elections and tech and lots of other things. You and I have been lucky enough to be in various forums talking about innovation, how this country can keep its edge in innovation and really compete in the technology race with China without shooting ourselves in the foot, so to speak. So if at some point in the session, the two of you could get to that topic, I would really appreciate it. With that, I'll hand it over to David.

01:47: I would love to.

01:49: Thank you.

01:49: Thank you, Anja.

01:51: Well, thanks, Anja, we will not miss that. Trust me, we plan to cover it. It's great to be back with Senator Warner, a friend, an occasional sparring partner, a book critic. I've gotten some of the most interesting critiques of what I've written from Senator Warner along the way, and I would say one of the most knowledgeable, if not the most knowledgeable person on these subjects in the halls of the Senate today, so I'm delighted you're joining us from your kitchen and even more delighted that you're not repeating the tuna melt experiment...

02:32: Don't try that at home. It's dangerous to your health.

02:36: So let me start, Senator, with a topic right on the news, which is TikTok. So we went in the

space of a few days from the President saying he would ban TikTok to the President getting a call from the CEO of Microsoft and agreeing that he would let Microsoft buy TikTok, assuming that they paid the US Treasury, which I haven't quite figured out yet. But we'll get to that in due course. And now, some question about where this whole transaction is. But before we get to the actual transaction, as you and I have discussed, the TikTok problem is a very different problem than, say, the Huawei problem. I know they all get lumped together but I think that you might be really... It might be a really good way to start the conversation if you could just lay out how you see the TikTok issue and how it differs from the challenge we face from a country trying to build our infrastructure the way China is hoping to do through Huawei.

03:44: Well, great question, David. And again, I think it shows a little bit of the haphazardness of this administration. Is TikTok a problem? Yes. But on the hierarchy of problems, we're talking about an app that allows you to make funny videos, that potentially the Chinese are taking that information and storing it, or retaining it back in China, and they may be limiting the ability to critique the Chinese government on TikTok. So should we be concerned if you're a member of our military or IC if you have TikTok on one of your devices? Yes, we should be concerned. But that is a completely different scale of problem than Huawei, where if you did an overview of where Huawei equipment has been sold into the United States, oftentimes to smaller telcos, because it is sold at a very attractive price point, you'll see where Huawei equipment is sold and where our nuclear missiles and missile systems are is almost a complete override.

05:00: And when you're talking about your telecommunications system, that is an issue of concern of much, much greater national security interest than TikTok. Yet, the President has taken more drastic action, a more drastic threat against TikTok than he's ever taken against Huawei. And my fear is... And then this kind of absurd comment that somehow he's going to decree that if this deal takes place, the US Treasury is going to get a cut if Microsoft buys, and I do think if Microsoft makes this acquisition, I have more faith in Microsoft's both maturity and willingness to try to bring a sophisticated approach to how they could separate some of the source code from... To draw out those distinctions than other companies.

05:57: But I fear at times, when the President kind of haphazardly kind of bings around on whatever happens to be the flashy object of the day, that this lack of a sophisticated approach in a sense gives fodder to other countries like India and Brazil and others, who are going to suddenly say, well, if America is taking out TikTok, we can preclude Facebook or Google or we can go after the American tech platform companies. So I think we have to have a more thoughtful approach. I think we need to be very clear when we call out a company why we feel it is a security concern. And this brings me back memories of years ago, how long it took us to deal with the Russian antivirus company that was embedded in so much of our American...

06:52: You're talking about Kaspersky?

06:55: Pardon me?

06:56: You're talking about Kaspersky?

06:57: Yes, Kaspersky. It took us years to get Kaspersky Labs off of the GSA acquisition list. That was a serious problem. Huawei building out 5G or dominating the worldwide 5G market is a serious problem. TikTok, yes, a problem, but not nearly of the same degree in magnitude as what your basic telecommunications hardware system is going to look like.

07:24: So if I was to summarize your position here, Kaspersky was a problem because it's an antivirus program that's embedded in all of your computers and thus sees the traffic, and you know and I've written about the fact that we believe the Russians actually got ahold of some NSA documentation after it ran through a computer that had Kaspersky software on it, and Russian intelligence saw it and grabbed it. Huawei's a problem because they're literally building the US infrastructure, could turn it on and off in times of conflict at the worst issue. TikTok, only a problem to your mind if it's sitting on the phones of somebody who's working in the military, the IC. Your own phone, you wouldn't keep it on there, but fundamentally you don't consider dance videos to be at the high end of American concerns.

08:17: Right. Absolutely, David. And what we have to be careful is if we cry wolf too often, the rest of the world is not going to accept American credibility when we have to actually call out a bad actor. I do think we've started to make some... Started to have some success with Huawei. It has been a long road, it has been, I think, lack of having a national policy for some time, but we are, I think, starting to see some turning the corner on Huawei. When we... If we were to, and from the President's language, he's even used at times stronger language against TikTok than he has against Huawei. To me, that is not a strategically smart choice.

09:10: Yesterday, and we discussed this a little bit before we came on, the State Department turned out news of an initiative. It wasn't a law, it wasn't regulations, basically to try to keep out a range of different kinds of Chinese products. They were worried about undersea cable, where, as you and I have discussed, the Chinese are laying a lot of cable across the Pacific and elsewhere. They were worried about new apps, they didn't mention TikTok in particular, but Secretary Pompeo certainly has in the past. They're worried about points of presence on the American network. The basic concept appeared to be, let's keep American traffic off of Chinese-dominated hardware and software. And my question to you is, in a world in which China is probably going to dominate 40% of the networks even if we are successful at keeping Huawei out of Europe and the United States and so forth, is it a reasonable defensive strategy to try to keep your traffic off of anything that could run through Chinese switches?

10:19: I think it becomes a very challenging problem. My background, as you know, but maybe the audience doesn't know, was in telecommunications. I was a cofounder of a company called Nextel, I was in the wireless industry since the early '80s. And there is a concern I have, if you've got a call that's going from St. Louis to Dallas and it's routed through Shanghai, that raises some concern, but whether we can preclude any of those traffic patterns is at least a technical challenge. And the idea... I've not seen the State Department missive yet, so I'd like to take a look at it, but I fear at times we don't seem to be having... We don't seem to have a full-blown sophisticated strategy about how we're going to take on China and how we're going to compete.

11:21: This in many ways goes back to Anja's initial comment when we opened the session, how does America stay competitive when I think what we see from China... And I think it's very

important, let me also make I think a very important caveat that I always try to make as I'm reminded of this, as we see the amount of anti-Asian-American, anti-Chinese-American prejudice that is brewing in our country, I want to make clear, I think China is a great nation, I think the Chinese people are a great people. My beef is with the Communist Party of China and how President Xi Jinping has been leading that party in an authoritarian way. It is not with China per se, and I think it is important to make that disclaimer at the front end.

12:08: But I do feel what China has perfected is an economic model that not only will it be challenging for American companies to compete against, but I think it'll be challenging for any Western company to compete against, and that is, when China allows ferocious domestic competition until a national champion arises, a la Huawei on 5G, that national champion then gets about 70% to 80% of the Chinese domestic market, which translates to 20% to 25% of the global market. So the company who becomes the Chinese national champion already has a leg up, and then as in the case of Huawei, China comes behind that national champion with \$100 billion financing terms so that Huawei can price itself with no reference to market-based pricing.

13:03: That is a quasi-state-run industrial policy, semi-capitalistic approach that I think has caught most of the West off-guard, and we're seeing it not only in the development... Let's stay with Huawei for a moment longer. Not only in terms of developing a system and a piece of equipment, but what we're seeing is China is also... The Chinese government is also flooding the zone in all of the standard-setting bodies... These standard-setting bodies, which are usually made up of engineers and technicians, these have generally been driven by American or Western interests in the past. Now China is trying to set the standards on 5G, on AI, on quantum, and this should be a concern not just to America, but it should be a concern to the West writ large.

13:58: So you and Anja have both written considerably about the other part of the strategy. You've basically argued, and pardon me for reducing this to its essence, that playing pure defense is not going to work here, and that we need to have an innovation policy that is as robust as our defense policy. For example, on Huawei, there's been a lot of discussion, but not a huge amount of action so far that I've been able to detect about building through perhaps an American or American-European consortium, an alternative for either Huawei 5G or focus on 6G technology. Tell us a little bit about that. What's that broader agenda look like?

14:45: Well, I think we have to... And we may need new terminology, but I think we have to re-examine our traditional aversion against industrial policy. What I think China practices is a very sophisticated 21st-century industrial policy. They pick areas where they hope to dominate, and then using state resources, they create a national champion and then support that national champion around the world. I'm finding, amongst my... Even my Republican colleagues, who normally have an aversion to this, a real willingness to rethink how we take on both governmental investments and our partnering with the private sector. Let me give you a couple of examples. People at times say, "Well, it's only the private sector that innovates." Well, that's not the case. If we think about GPS, GPS was purely a government invention, funded by the United States at about \$4.2 billion. In 2020 dollars, that would have been about \$15 billion of investment in a technology that the government created for then the greater use across the whole marketplace.

16:05: Recently, in the National Defense Authorization Act, John Cornyn and I partnered together

on putting together what would be the first step of a major investment in the semiconductor industry. We've got a bill called CHIPS that would bring over TSMC, the Taiwanese major manufacturer, to build a fab plant here in America but would also create a multi-billion-dollar fund to support American and other leadership that would be built in America around semiconductors. I've got legislation as well, again with John Cornyn and Richard Burr and Marco Rubio about creating an investment fund for 5G that would be kind of 5G-plus that would move into the next generation, called Open RAN, O-RAN, type development, where we bring in much more software-based systems, rather than a single hardware-based standard.

17:02: In other words, have a system in which you wouldn't need a Huawei white box at all, you could just take a generic white box and do it all as a software switch, is that...

17:17: Much better description. And it would allow not a single company, but a series of companies, American and otherwise, to come in on software bases where we're still the leader. So I think, how do we craft this strategy? I think we do need to identify areas where we think it is in America's interest to maintain its innovation lead. I think we do need to have governmental involvement, and it may range from the multiple billions that we've talked about in the semiconductors, to, we were relatively modest in the 5G and O-RAN plan of about a billion and a half dollars, and half of that being... Or about 500 million of that being to develop international consortiums.

18:06: And then I think we need to think about what alliances will look like in the 21st century, which I think will be less based upon military power and more based upon coalitions of the willing around countries that have a rule of law that will agree to have some level of sharing of technology, and I think the beginnings, the Brits have suggested this, might be Europe writ large, India, Korea, Japan, Australia, the United States, New Zealand, countries like that, where we have a series of common interests and we already have deep-seated scientific interrelationships.

18:49: And as you listen to that name, with the exception of India, those were also the Five Eyes nations, by and large.

18:55: Yes. Although I think we would include the Scandinavian nations, the balance of NATO, and I think there's a great deal of interest in India, and if we're going to... If we're going to push back against urging Prime Minister Modi not to do data localization and not to have an effect of trying to copy a Chinese strategy in India, then India would have to be, I think, welcomed into this other kind of alliance of the willing.

19:29: So let me move on. We could do this for forever, but you and I have spent a lot of the past three years discussing Russia, the elections, election security, and so forth. So you've seen a series of vague warnings from the intelligence community, I think Bill Evanina and others turned out some in recent times. There was some kind of briefing the other day for senators that some of your colleagues emerged from, who are less steeped in this than you are as the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, quite alarmed by what they heard that the Russians were up to in specific. They began to issue tweets saying more of this has to be made public.

20:13: When you ask the government publicly, government officials publicly, what have they seen the Russians doing right now, their answer is, well, some disinformation, this and that, but nothing on the scale that we were looking at in August of 2016, exactly four years ago. So first, give us your independent assessment, since you're getting all of this through the Intelligence Committee, and tell me why it is that there seems to be such a disconnect between the public discourse and the kind of alarm we're hearing from your colleagues on Twitter when they emerge from these briefings.

20:53: Well, David, obviously, I cannot share any of the classified information, and we have had one public release from the administration that called out not just Russia, but Russia, China and Iran.

21:08: That's right.

21:09: And I think Bill Evanina, I have a lot of faith in Bill. He is someone that I advocated for his being confirmed for over two years when he was held up by another senator on a totally unrelated matter, and I think there is the natural reaction within the IC that says we don't want to give up sources and methods, we don't want to show our hand at all. I think the threat is serious from all three of these nations, it appears in different forms, and we are better prepared, we're better prepared because our election systems are more secure. We do need additional money for securing those systems, but Chris Krebs at CISA has done a good job. Virtually all of our systems have the Albert system connected to them, we're better because Facebook, Google and Twitter are not perfect by any means, they recognize the problem and are at least partnering with us, and we're better because whether in the group with the NSA or grouped with the Director of National Intelligence Office and elsewhere within the government, we have gotten better at identifying the bad guys.

22:33: What we have not done yet, though, is I think made the level of disclosure that we need to make to the American public, and I'm going to continue to push the administration to get this information out in a way that, again, protects sources and methods, because remember, voting this year is going to start much earlier in many states. In my state it starts September 19, and just because we have not seen the Russians ramp up August 4th doesn't mean that we won't see further activity a month from now. And there are stories, and I think there are... There are stories, not stories, there are... The American public needs to be informed about some of the Russian disinformation campaigns that are taking place right now.

23:34: Let me just drill down a little bit on this, because you said you were getting different kinds of challenges from Russia, China and Iran. In 2016, we had efforts by the Russians to hack the systems, they were in the registration systems, your committee said they thought of all 50 states, but certainly in significant ways in a few, and they were also hacking minds, right, in disinformation. Tell me how you're seeing Russian tactics change, we understand they're moving more to the base of the US using US servers and so forth, and then we did not see China and Iran in 2016, we did a little bit in 2018, but that was a mid-term. Just separate out for us what kind of activity you think you're seeing?

24:27: I think, again, that is the job of the Director of National Intelligence to take this information

and move it through a declassification process and inform the American public. It is my responsibility as the Vice Chair of the Intelligence Committee to not get in front of them, but I do feel very, very strongly that the first document that was put out was not sufficient, it is a good first step.

25:04: You're talking about Evanina's document.

25:06: Yes, yes. But I do believe that this will be the... I have been assured that this is going to be the first step of what would be hopefully a number of disclosures and again, I think there are both concerns about obviously protecting sources and methods, there's concerns about amplifying Russian disinformation campaigns, these are all valid debates, but the...

25:32: You're talking about the registration system. Obviously, if we're moving to a world in which there's going to be a lot more mail-in voting, mail-in ballots, your registration system's got to be really full proof under those circumstances, because otherwise we're not mailing that ballot to Mark Warner in Virginia, or when you mail it back and then show up at the voting booth in November 3rd, you need a system that makes it clear you've already voted.

26:02: I believe we've gotten much better at the electoral level, the actual machines, the tabulation, the voting systems. I still have some concerns, if you go up to those three companies that control about, as IT vendors, about 90% of the voter files, those are private companies and the kind of protections we've brought in at the voting system level, the registrar level, I don't think we've got the same level of security upstream with the three private companies that dominate the voter registration list serve. And I think we do need more work there.

26:43: But in terms of the concerns particularly in an election, with the threat of COVID that we may be having unprecedented numbers of Americans vote, I'm very concerned about what this administration is doing in terms of what appears to be, and I know this is the subject of some of the next COVID negotiations that are going on right now, but we are hearing horror stories from around the nation where it seems as if the postal system is being gummed up almost on purpose, that where some processing machines may be being taken out of urban areas, and I think there are some real questions that need to be answered by the new Postmaster General who seems to... His best qualification was he is a very much a Trump loyalist, and that seems to be more important than an efficient running of our postal system. So I'm almost more concerned about what's... In terms of vote by mail, of what's going on within...

27:51: The processing...

27:52: The running of our postal system domestically than I am about at this moment in time, a foreign government trying to interfere with somehow the mail system.

28:05: Great.

28:05: We seem to be messing that up on our own, and I think the American public deserves an answer on that.

28:12: Okay. We're going to turn to our questioners. I want to remind people that in the chat function, they can raise their hand. And as we're getting them to raise their hand, I just have one very quick question on a different topic, I wanted to make sure that we got you on the record on, Senator. Which is, you've read our coverage and others about Afghanistan, and the concern about whether there was an intelligence report on the bounties, the warning that...

28:45: David, at least on my computer, you have frozen up.

28:52: David, we lost you for a minute. I think maybe if I can continue the question...

28:55: You heard me there, okay.

28:57: Oh, you're back, thanks. Go ahead, David. Welcome back.

28:58: Okay, good. I was saying, Senator, as we're getting ready to go to questions, whether or not you've got any update for us on the Afghan bounty issue.

29:10: Any time that American military personnel are put in harm's way by foreign powers, this is of enormous concern. And we have had briefings on this, I have not been fully satisfied with those briefings. And there was clearly public testimony that there was at least, I believe, as late as March meetings held on this subject amongst the chief deputies' level. But I don't have anything new to add on that subject today that's declassified.

30:03: Okay, I'm having a hard time seeing the raised hands, so can somebody in our group call on the first questioner while I'm trying to get those down?

30:15: Absolutely. Jane Harman has a question. Jane, if you could unmute yourself.

30:23: Hey, Jane.

30:32: Hi, Jane.

30:32: We can hear you, Jane.

30:32: I'm working on it. Did I do it?

30:35: You did it, Jane.

30:36: Yes, I did it. Hi, folks. David, phenomenal article today in the Times on what's going on with Saudi Arabia, you and Mark and others. So Mark, thank you for your service in the Senate. That Intelligence Committee seems to work pretty well. Sadly, the one I served on, well, not so good. But I'm asking about the quality of intelligence that you're getting from an IC that has been gutted both deliberately and a lot of the senior people have left. And what got my attention recently was an article in the New York Times Magazine that David didn't write about the... Sorry, David,

could have written.

31:17: Okay, you know, we...

31:20: About the quality of intelligence that went into the NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq. I bought it, I read everything, and the intelligence was garbage and deliberately distorted in some cases. So my question to you is, are you confident or somewhat confident, or how do you feel about the intelligence you're getting from the IC, and whether it enables you to make good judgments on some of the things David's been asking you about? And if you don't have confidence, what is it that you could do in your position to try to make... To try to be sure that you don't have to suffer what I suffered with really poor intelligence, prepared and presented?

32:05: Well, Jane, first of all, thank you and thank you for your great service at the Wilson Center. This is a concern of mine. It's a concern of mine because I think we both know the mantra of the IC is to speak truth to power. But we've seen under this president anyone who speaks truth to power gets fired. We've seen Dan Coats fired, Sue Gordon as chief deputy fired. We've seen his replacement Admiral Joe Maguire fired. We've seen his deputy fired. We've seen the Inspector General, Mr. Atkinson, fired. We've seen the NCTC long-term director fired. There was a while where there was no Senate-confirmed individual at all in the whole ODNI.

32:55: And as we've seen some of these folks who kind of, I think, reinforced some of the remaining leaders' willingness to kind of remain independent... I think some of the remaining leaders have not continued to show the level of independence that I would like. And I do fear at times, and there's been a number of op-eds written, and I saw one by Mike Morell that had a number of former IC leaders that are very concerned that the... If not directly, at least indirectly, there is a growing fear within the community that if you speak truth to power, if you highlight what the Russians are doing right now in an election that might be embarrassing to this White House, it could cost you your job. And I am extraordinarily concerned about not the quality of the people, I think that the people in the IC are great, but I think we need to restore their independence and Marco Rubio now who's acting chair has agreed with me on that. We're trying to send that signal, but it is a challenge. I would argue that the biggest thing we could do to return independence to the IC is to change who lives in the White House in 89 days.

34:21: So what you're saying, Senator, is that you believe the President's constant statements are actually keeping members of the IC from calling out election threats today? Is that the essence of your argument?

34:32: What I'm saying is... No, David, I'm not going that... I'm saying that I believe that the IC needs to be more forthcoming in terms of relaying to the American public. I mean, in many ways the IC normally has... Who is its customer? Its customer is usually the White House, its customer is Congress, its customer may be different parts of the IC or military. Well, in the case of elections, I think the customer is the American public. And we owe the obligation to push the IC, even into a little bit of its discomfort zone to reveal more about what outside threats will look like in this election. And it is my strong hope that they'll get there.

35:18: What I'm saying, though, what I fear is, is that even line analysts, not just about Russian elections, but the constant berating by the White House of the IC, I think has an effect on morale. I think it has an effect on the ability to recruit and retain some of the best. I think it is changing and we've seen again, that litany of people I talked about who were fired, those were not Obama people. Those were all Trump appointees that this president picked and then chose to fire because I think in the most case, they tried to tell the truth.

36:00: Let's move on to Jonathan Miller, who has a question for us. Jonathan.

36:12: Hello? Can you hear me?

36:12: Yes, we can.

36:14: Excellent. Gentlemen, thank you for the conversation. It's been really interesting, appreciate being included. I wanted to return to the point of your conversation where you were talking about comparing Huawei to TikTok vis-a-vis what kinds of threat they represent. I understand why Huawei would be perceived as more of a threat, given sort of access to direct infrastructure near national security assets. But I hesitate to underestimate the issue with TikTok, particularly in an era where actors will use virality to achieve aims, whether that's blind activity vis-a-vis the Russians or someone like Audrey Tang who uses humor to attract users. And with something like TikTok, that can represent hundreds of millions of opportunities to access secure systems. So am I overestimating the threat that TikTok could pose or how am I misinterpreting this?

37:12: Well, as someone who is not an active TikTok user, I may be underestimating both its appeal and reach, but it does seem to me to be different. I think, as I've said, I think we should... I don't want it on a military member's phone. I don't want it on a member of Congress's phone. As a father, I wouldn't want it on my three daughters' phones. But the language and tenor of attack that the President took against TikTok versus the approach he's taken on Huawei, I do think there is a different level of threat. And I think at times, if we equate all Chinese activity on a completely equal footing, not to use the overused analogy, but we become the boy who cried wolf so many times that the rest of the world doesn't listen.

38:20: Senator, I hope I'm not departing from my reportorial evenhandedness here when I say that, I think it is a grateful nation that you are not regularly a TikTok user. I haven't heard a demand for the Mark Warner TikTok dance.

38:41: I know, you don't... You somehow may be saying that you don't think I may be a style setter in my dance just as I was not a style setter in my culinary skills.

38:53: All looking for the Warner TikTok dance.

38:56: That's it. Anja, I was actually looking forward to you asking the last question here, 'cause I know we're running out of time.

39:03: Wonderful. Thank you so much, David, for masterful moderating, as you always do. Senator

Warner, thank you for all those fantastic questions. I have to tell you, jokingly, on this one, I hope we do ban TikTok because I will have my preteens back, totally addicted. [chuckle] So one last question for you, 'cause you touched on it briefly talking with how do we coordinate better with India, with Japan, with South Korea on all of these important technology issues. Last night, our last session was with Audrey Tang who's the digital minister of Taiwan and she's wonderful, of course. She's using humor to push back on the disinformation that the Chinese are putting out in their election system. She's gotten the social media companies to be much tougher and do no micro targeting of political or issue ads before elections. They're just doing all of the things that our nation hasn't been able to. Is it time to A, learn from other countries and B, coordinate some of these technologies policies with them, and how would you do that?

40:08: One, I think it is time for us to learn from other countries. I think one of the things I raised with the administration recently is let's learn from Sweden. Let's learn from the Baltic nations who the way they counter Russian disinformation is they educate their population so that when Russians are spreading stories about Ukraine or whatever, the population knows, "Well, that's just another Russian disinformation campaign." We have not done that in any kind of sophisticated way in this country, and I think we can learn from other nations, number one. Number two, I do think we need... The world yearns for a return of American leadership. We sometimes fumble around a little bit, but for the most part, the world thinks we are based on a rule of law that we do represent our set of values.

41:07: And I think that that leadership, the loss of that leadership and with this kind of America-first approach that this White House has, I think if we do change the White House, there would be a real welcoming of a chance to build new alliances around these technology areas. And I do think it's going to require increased investment at the governmental level and where I'm happy, where I'm pleased there is I'm seeing, at least on the Senate side, a broad bipartisan consensus that is going to require public-private alliances, whether it be semiconductors, 5G, AI, quantum, you name whatever the cutting edge technologies. And I think so many of my colleagues recognize that we're going to have to do that in concert both with other nations and it is going to take more than the private sector. Now we simply have to get some of the appropriators to agree to put the kind of dollars in that we need, but I remain very hopeful on that notion of both American leadership and collaboration with that coalition of the willing around the world.

42:21: Thank you. May you be right. I hope we can implement it. I'll just echo what David is saying, we are very grateful that you are in public service and that you're able to teach maybe the rest of your colleagues in the Congress more about all the important technology issues that are out there, and that will be forefront for our nation's security. Thank you to both of you for participating, David and Senator Warner.

42:44: Thank you, Anja.

42:45: Thank you.

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