

Speaker 1: [00:06](#) [inaudible]. Thank you, sir. Thank you. Thank you, sir. John.

Nick Burns: [00:14](#) Okay, so we're in the bottom of the ninth inning or we're an extra time. If you're a European global football fan, we thought we would, um, have a final session. We're going to break by four 25, four 28. Those of you who want to see representative Adam Schiff, and I hope you do, we can walk over to green wall tent that begins at five o'clock. We thought we'd try to sum up what have we learned over the last three days? What are the big issues and themes that emerge? And I can't think of any two of our participants who are better able to do that for us than to people who have spent decades, each of them observing, observing their friends, but mostly observing rivals and enemies to serving thought patterns, trying to delineate global trend lines that effect the United Kingdom and the United States of America. So John Scarlet to my right, former chief, the secret intelligence service of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, otherwise known as mia six, the oldest continuously active intelligence service.

Nick Burns: [01:24](#) He wants me to say in the world, think James Bond, at least the boss of James Bond. And Sir John is a great friend of the United States and a great analyst, John McLaughlin, former acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency, former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, former director of the intelligence directorate of the Central Intelligence Agency, former director of European affairs of the Central Intelligence Sec Agency, a comrade in arms, uh, at the end of the Cold War. Uh, when we were trying to figure out what was happening to the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact countries, I was working for President George h w Bush, along with Condoleeza Rice as the two persons Soviet team. We call John to come in and brief President George H w Bush. And we're also joined by a great American Patriot judge William Webster, former director of the CIA. Please join me in welcoming judge Webster.

Speaker 1: [02:40](#) [inaudible].

Nick Burns: [02:40](#) So I, I told, uh, the two Johns that I would ask them three questions based on three big themes. What do you think about what we've heard? Then we're going to open up to you. Let us know what you've heard. What are your, what are your takeaways? What are your questions for these two gentlemen? First question, running every panel. And in fact, in our minds as we organize this conference is the Trump administration has been absolutely right to say, and their national security strategy and the national military strategy that for the first time as this nine 11, while terrorism is an abiding concern, the greater

threat to the United States is the emergence. Well, I shouldn't say emergence. The continuation of Russia and China as two great authoritarian powers dedicated to cut the United States in the United Kingdom down to size. So, John, do you agree with that? And, and listening to the conversation, do we in the West have the right policies to contain and limit these two countries?

John Scarlett:

[03:46](#)

Well, nick, thank you. Um, thank you for the introduction. I do agree, uh, obviously that, uh, the reemergence of great power competition, uh, is, is, uh, a marked feature of the last few of the last few years. Um, and it needs to be expressed properly and it has been clearly expressed in the national defense strategy, which is the right place to, um, to broadcast it. Um, and it's caught and attention and it forces everybody to think about, well, what does that actually mean? I'm a bit concerned, uh, that, um, the, there's a tendency for the sort of non-state actor threat because we're reacting against our previous sort of absolute focus on that for it to be put to one side or at least reduced in, uh, in prominence and that that process can slightly get out of control. And the new Philo world we've done that, we've won that.

John Scarlett:

[04:42](#)

Um, it's not such a big thing anymore. And, uh, if you're coming from a background like me, um, and indeed you're learning about the things you're learning about, you know, day by day, even now, um, and, and very well, it hasn't gone away. Absolutely not. In fact, if you talked to the heads of the, um, security agencies, certainly in Europe, they'll say that the threat level, um, from terrorist activities as high as it's ever been, and we had five major attacks in the UK in 2017 and I can go on. So I just wanted to make that point. So it's important not to over simplified and there is a risk obviously, uh, that by talking about great power competition, we get into the word adversaries and we'd been hearing that a lot, you know, in the last few days. And so what do we mean by aversary? What form could that take? Are we talking about a competitor? Um, vine and solvers have been all we're talking about, you know, a potential enemy. Inevitably, potential enemy is the word, but potential is an important word, but you can quickly slip into enemy and drop the potential. Uh, and so it can become oversimplified as a debate. Uh, and I think we do have to be, we do have to be careful about that.

Nick Burns:

[05:55](#)

Can I just say too, in we choose words very carefully as you do in intelligence, China and Russia are clearly competitors, rivals, adversaries. Enemy is someone you're about to fight.

John Scarlett: [06:06](#) Yes. And it's the wrong word for these two countries. Yes, yes. Use me for any rum. Then of course, the issue as well. Um, you know, what are we actually talking about in practice? What are the, uh, where's the areas of competition? Where are the areas of difficulties? What are the challenges? And that's a huge and extremely interesting debate. Um, certainly if we're taking, uh, China and Russia, by the way, I'd say that Russia and Russian colleagues certainly of mine will be delighted to hear themselves being discussed at the same level as China and, uh, the United States. I mean, that is one of the key objectives that President Putin has had ever since he's been in par, is to get back to be taken seriously at that level. But of course they are, um, very different. Uh, and by, and I think he has come through from our discussion that by far the most complex challenge in the longterm is from China.

John Scarlett: [06:58](#) Clearly just because of the power of the economy, the extraordinary change in speed, um, which just happened over my career, um, uh, of Chinese par and, and success. Uh, and uh, but at the same time as a society, very authoritarian, very authoritarian society of first of all, do we fully understand what that actually means? And for the first time, uh, the Western world liberal democracy is that, that's the expression I like liberal democracies. Um, we face a challenge from a very authoritarians state, which arguably in some respects is more successful than we are. And now that we have not faced that before, so it really needs thinking through what does that, that mean? It's not as simple thing. Uh, Russia obviously is not in the same, um, is not in the same category, but it has been said here. That may be, it represents some in a more immediate sort of threat, if you like, or challenge because they feel the pressure more immediately. And therefore the risk of some sort of lashing out or some kind of misunderstanding, um, uh, from, from Moscow, uh, is maybe higher than, uh, than from, uh, uh, maybe a more slow moving process in Beijing.

Nick Burns: [08:20](#) Thank you. John McLaughlin on this question. Yeah. We refer colloquially to the rise of China, but actually it's the return of China to power in 18, in the last 20 centuries, China was the world's global largest global economy, right? Henry Kissinger in his 2011 book on China, brilliance as it is a civilization, right? That expects to be in power and it's, is it clearly now appear competitor of the United States? Well, nick, I don't think it's there yet. Uh, when I think about China, uh, I think first kind of three, three, two or three

John McLaughlin: [08:56](#) big realities here. First, it's complicated. That's so we can't reduce it to simplicity terms. And when you said a few minutes

ago, uh, not to use the word enemy, that's an important observation. Agree. Yeah. We don't know yet. Really. There's a kind of China fever rising in Washington and it's appropriate that we would recognize it as a serious competitor and Challenger and that we not be complacent about. It's, it's uh, uh, chances of overtaking us in the world. But we don't really know yet whether the right term is competitor adversary. Do we have to rule out partners yet? If you think about one of the realities here, and here's an important reality, these two countries, the United States and China and their economies will affect the whole world for the rest of our lives. So this is a big responsibility for the United States, for the world, not just for America first, it's for the world. So we have to think about that also with China. Nick, going to your point, I'm reminded of two things about them as a civilization. A friend of mine visited a Chinese museum and I won't describe the object that it was an unusual object. And he asked the museum director, what is that thing? And he explained it and he said, it's 1300 years old. And he said, you know, that was a good millennium.

John McLaughlin:

[10:36](#)

Second Story. I'm walking down the street in Beijing with a, uh, a former Chinese intelligence officer. We were both at a conference and we were both playing that we weren't in that business anymore. I'm not, but I'm not sure about him. And, and I, we passed a, and this was some years ago, this was before she, but we passed a big poster of Mao. They're everywhere. And I said, tell me about Mao. And he said, wow. He created modern China den shopping. He reformed our economy. Sean's him in. He took us into the world. Who's in town? He lifted us up. I don't know what he'd say about g today. Maybe he's doing some repairs. I don't know. But the point is, no American thinks that way. So we need to understand that with China, they are looking to the future with, uh, a theory of coming from a distant past, looking to a glorious future. Uh, you know, we're worried about 20, 20. So we need to have that longterm perspective in dealing with China and therefore we need to be very and think far ahead. And there's an opportunity. I said to one of our ambassadors here, this is a really off the, at the, at this forum, we could have off the wall ideas. Uh, we could change history.

John McLaughlin:

[12:10](#)

What if we could work out a kind of understanding if not a partnership among China, Japan, and the United States. Now I can make the argument about why that could never happen.

John McLaughlin:

[12:24](#)

But think about it. I'll leave you this one other thought. When we talk about rivals and adversaries, uh, what is it that we would really fight for? I mean, fight, I mean, deploy men material and inflict violence. What would we really fight for?

Would it be in support of a treaty ally whose sovereignty was violated? I think so, but we have to think about that because another reality, I'm going to stop now, but another reality about these two relationships are they're complicated. We want to maintain our preeminence, but we really don't want to go to war. And that's tricky.

Nick Burns: [13:07](#)

So on this first theme of China and Russia, how do we deal with authoritarian states? I would just say one thing our modern presidents have all had to deal with. It's complicated the complexity of the world and I think that all of our recent presidents would be unified in saying that we're fighting a battle of strategic positioning in East Asia with the Chinese. We want to remain the most powerful. They want to replace this. We're fighting a battle for trade supremacy that's happening right now. We're fighting a battle for technology, the technological future, who's going to dominate the AI quantum computing space and we're fighting a battle of ideologies. JFK and Reagan were our foremost facture proponents of the West. The idea of liberal democracy shouldn't ping if I can take John's unity. He has strengthened the party and he's gone out to the rest of the world, has said our system is superior.

Nick Burns: [14:05](#)

The challenge for our presidents and our British prime ministers is balancing the competition in those four areas with what we need to do together with China. We are the two largest carbon emitters. We will not resolve climate change without each other. And that was the President Obama President, Xi joint venture of 2015, the Paris climate accord. And if you think of trafficking, human beings, drug and climbed cartels, all the transnational issues, pandemics, we can't do much without China. I think that balancing these two imperatives is going to be vital. It's complicated. We can't see them as the enemy because we need them as well as we need to compete with them. Is that fair enough? The summation on the begging of the will? I have complicated, um, ah, I can't resist

John Scarlett: [14:52](#)

the temptation to say that, um, when I'm being also particularly difficult to question by my children or grandchildren now and I don't, I, I take it so far and then I say it's too complicated to explain it and they, they know that. Can I, can I just finish off that please? The, but I just picking up the word challenge. Uh, given all that we're saying about China and as you've just said, the reality is that liberal democracy is, but maybe particularly obviously if the United States, it's just going to end, what does that actually mean in day to day contact of business? Um, you know, yes, you can have a sort of sense of competition in Asia for example, or Southeast Asia or almost anywhere in eastern

Europe, central Europe and in Latin America. Uh, but at the same time you're going to have to be working together on a whole range of things.

John Scarlett: [15:47](#) This is much more complicated than was the case or has been the case in the past. That's a really major and complicated challenge. These he really careful thought. And the second point, which is completely different and I did really try to bring it out in one of my questions and a couple of days ago is that with Russia and there were see that as a different issue. How do you manage to conduct that if very important relationship and good mutual understanding and effective dialogue at the same time as dealing with challenging behavior of the kind that UK in particular has had to face is a really difficult issue.

John McLaughlin: [16:22](#) Right? Feed another company. Another part of the complexity here is that the United States, while we have these rising powers as rivals, and I associate myself completely with Sir John's point about, uh, don't lose sight of terrorism because in my old business, that's where the biggest surprises would come from me. Uh, I'll just leave it at that. Uh, but the United States has not had a lot of practice in the kind of world we're in. Now. Some people say, oh, it's like the 1930s. No, it's not. No, it's not. Because in the 1930s, we were not yet the global leader. We became the global leader as a result of, and in the aftermath of World War II and all we've known since then, 70 years of cold war, a bilateral competition that we won. And then 17 years between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 2008 financial crisis when we were number one and unchallenged. And then from there to here, we're in a new world where as a global leader with all of these privileges and such, we're being challenged for the first time. So it's not a world that we have practice in and it's not a world we have a label for. You know, we've always had a label civil war preserve the union world war one say for democracy, World War II, defeat the Nazis. Cold War contain the Soviet. What's the label today?

John McLaughlin: [17:48](#) That is such challenging question

Nick Burns: [17:50](#) and I would say the biggest threat to us right now is not rushing shine. It's ourselves meaning, and I'm not talking politics, it's the assault on democracy by the right wing, anti-democratic populous like Marine Le Pen and geared Vilders in Europe and alternative for Deutschland. And so we need to revive the West. Of course we need to contain these two powers and just strengthen our democracies, gain some self confidence that we are the exceptional country and alliance and that the democratic countries of the world have the superior system,

defend that revive the West. What do you think? Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Um,

John McLaughlin: [18:35](#) because we, as we're thinking of China, I mean, you referred earlier to this, we of course could never imagine China as a model, but there are people in the world who could, yeah, yeah. You know, that they can see a, this is a country that has very tight political control and seems to be growing economically. Some economists say they'd be twice our size economically if they don't have some disruption between now and 20, 50. So there are people in the world. If our system falters, you know, they will push their system. Now, I'm not suggesting anyone wants to be led by China, including most of their neighbors who are just desperately, uh, fear, afraid that we will not be robustly president. The people of Hong Kong, people of Hong Kong. So I don't overstate that, but a certainly agree nick that a fix ourselves here. When I say at home, I mean among the liberal democracies starting with the wonderful special relationship we have with the UK,

Nick Burns: [19:36](#) we, we've now drifted into theme two. And I would ask for John and John to comment, I think in every panel including on just this last panel, nearly all the speakers have said the United States works best when we work with Canada. When we work with the U K NATO, our East Asian allies, that alliances actually don't weaken us. They actually magnify our power. How are we doing in a complicated world and taking advantage of our democratic alliance

John Scarlett: [20:07](#) if an odd come on to that. Cause it's a really interesting question but just to pick up, cause I did not say your previous point about the, as of if you like a threat to our own systems from rising pauperism and so on. I just have to say that, um, the last two or three years I've been in so many discussions about populism, uh, very often from sort of academics and think tankers and intellectuals in Paris or somewhere, and I come away thinking nobody here knows what it means. And I don't know what it means exactly either. So, um, I think understanding what we really mean there and talking about is, is a huge subject in its own right. So I'm putting down a marker on, on the words and the concept of positivism. You're right. And that's why I modified it by saying anti-democratic populism, marine Le Pen, alternative for Deutschland, victor or Bond Salvini in Italy.

John Scarlett: [21:03](#) That's the threat. But the complication is that salvation is that he gets a little votes. So it's a, anyway, it's complicated. It's complicated. It's complicated because now old allies are not conflict on them. On allies. Yes. Is very interesting. And we're

going to be sort of thought provoking the way that's come out from our discussions and here. And it just brings forward as we're talking here about, you know, great powers and China and United States and perhaps Russia and so on. Uh, but you know, what marks the United States out. Um, and of course it is allies and its allies, not just in the traditional sort of great power sentence, but in a much deeper sense. Um, it's a fundamentally linked to shared history, shared experiences, um, to, um, there's a great deal of emotion in it. Um, there's a great deal of commitment in it. Um, where my, you know, talking here obviously from the point of view of one ally, but you know, the other allies that I know, I'm just a belief, uh, in, uh, the basically beneficial leadership, um, and positive leadership of the United States of America.

John Scarlett:

[22:15](#)

Um, that, you know, I've once said to an audience in the, in the u s of I bet my whole professional life on that and they all stood up and cheered, but they'll do that now. But it actually is a true statement and it's true for pretty well all my, all my colleagues and, and, and my country actually. Um, and this is, uh, uh, this is a sort of huge and fundamental point. Uh, uh, so, um, you know, that's, uh, I just wants that somehow and that, and that doesn't absolutely doesn't exist and it's not in China, doesn't really have any allies, right. As such. Right. And if that has almost a deliberate policy of not having permanent ally that is Russia and, uh, um, well rotten that claims have some allies but not many of them of volunteers.

John Scarlett:

[23:05](#)

So, so, um, uh, equally is so tied up with territorial issues and ethnic issues. And so actually that's a slightly loose, I mean, reply from me there because it's, it cuts across traditional national boundaries and there's rather short, the different, um, uh, but it's worth all the say, making. The basic point is that fundamental difference, uh, between, um, between, uh, the great powers and it really must be understood here in the United States. Thank you. Yeah. We're not, when you ask that question, I, you know, you may recall I spent a year on detail with the students and I was lucky enough to be there during the

John McLaughlin:

[23:46](#)

leadership of George Schultz. Yes. Great. Secretary of state. Yes, he was. And George Schultz always said a diplomacy is about tending the garden. Yeah. Right. Yeah. And he didn't, he didn't mean spending more, you know, it's, it's not about how much you spend. It's about how you feel. It's about constantly being in touch with those, with whom you are allied, talking to them, calling them, uh, not expecting much in return. Uh, it's the same in the intelligence world by the way. There's, uh, in our relations with foreign intelligence services. And um, the, the one final

point I'd make about alliances is if we are in a world where our preeminence is challenged and where China is growing at a rate that will challenge us in terms of not being able to spend our way, we won't be able to spend our way to a leadership for alliances then become your force multiplier because China doesn't have any, right. It's the forced multiplier. Yeah. And if we don't handle that well, we are just flushing it away.

Nick Burns: [24:54](#)

I'm going to, um, so true. I want to open us up to questions, but just a very, very brief story to illustrate. John John's point and answer. John's point on nine 11 when we were hit very hard, 3000 people dead in three of our states. Uh, I was the very, very new 12 days ambassador at NATO. We Americans and the Brits, I think had always assumed from the early Cold War period, 1949 forward, that if, if NATO had to go to war, it would be the United States and Canada crossing the pond a third time in the 20th century to defend Europe. So the huge irony of nine 11 was that our allies came to us in Brussels to my mission to be and said, we want to invoke article five and attack on one of the treaty NATO treaty is, shall be deemed an attack on all. We were attacked.

Nick Burns: [25:46](#)

My Canadian colleague and I give him huge credit. David Wright called and said, have you thought about invoking article five? We operate by consensus. Every ally had to agree. I had just come from Greece where I was ambassador. I was worried about the Greeks. By that evening, by midnight and Brussels, every ally had agreed to go to war with us. The next morning at 10:00 AM muscles time, I called Condoleezza Rice, the national security advisor, four in the morning. I said, Condi, the allies want to invoke article five. They want to go to war with us. I need the president's permission. She said, go for it. I said, but I need the president's personal permission. I'm going to cast this vote. She said, go for it. And I said, but Condi, and she interrupted me and she said, nick, the president's had the worst day. Go for it. I said, I'll take that as my presidential instruction.

Nick Burns: [26:39](#)

She said, one more thing. It's good to have friends in the world. It's good to have friends. Who can, I can, I know can, if I can. Just that was she wrote about that and her memoirs for any American to reflect that. On our worst day, everybody stood up for us that everybody went into Afghanistan, that everyone, they're still there today, every NATO ally and they've suffered a thousand combat deaths. The Russians and Chinese have no one willing to stand up and we have our allies. May We treat them well? Excuse me, could I add a personal story on the same theme please? Yeah. And then it tells you something about the two countries represented right here on that day,

John McLaughlin: [27:28](#) the day after nine 11, you could imagine what the CIA was like.

Speaker 1: [27:34](#) Oh,

John McLaughlin: [27:36](#) a plaintiff arrived baring the head of the [inaudible] John's predecessor, the Adams. He's multi as well. I'm sorry.

Speaker 5: [27:48](#) Right. Well that, thanks for that because, yeah, thank you. Thanks for that. Cause I was about to lose it. My point was this,

John McLaughlin: [28:02](#) the, the head of the British intelligence service, the head of the British Secret Service GCHQ and the national, uh, essentially they're a foreign policy advisor for the prime minister arrived on a plane to embrace the CIA leadership the day after nine 11. Yep. At a time when all of our airspace was closed. By the way, I don't know how you guys did that. It's that old James Bond thing.

Speaker 5: [28:28](#) Uh, but yeah,

John McLaughlin: [28:30](#) was enormously gratifying to us to be, to know we had that kind of support on the worst day in our lives.

Speaker 1: [28:41](#) I [inaudible]

Nick Burns: [28:49](#) I think that, um, Americans who've served, uh, throughout our government and the State Department, Defense Department, the intelligence agencies feel emotionally connected to our allies because as yen Stoltenberg said to us on the very first night he did, it's not about money and it's not about power. It's about democracy surviving and prospering. And that is the spirit we have to have about the United Kingdom, about Canada, which is represented here today and about all of our allies. Yes,

John McLaughlin: [29:19](#) agreed. It was a very powerful password. Very powerful. A statement from Yen Saltzman Park was, uh, you know, our part rests on

Nick Burns: [29:28](#) being together and being credible out to you. Yes, sir. And we'll wait for the Mike right down here in front. Yes.

Audience Member: [29:42](#) Good catch. Uh, Mark Davis perhaps because I'm a child of the fifties and sixties, um, where it seemed like we had an existential military threat literally every day. I recall the old retention drills, which some of you remember when we were going to hide from the Russians by, uh, you know, pulling down the blinds of our windows and our school. Um, I don't view, and

I'd like you guys to comment, um, I don't view the threat from China as being that way. It just doesn't seem as if it would make any logical sense for China to destroy its greatest market militarily. Could you comment on the relative threats militarily of, of both this, uh, these great powers as we've been talking?

John Scarlett:

[30:35](#)

Well, not picks up, you know, point I think we were all trying to make, um, um, earlier wrong, uh, that, uh, the word, I think the word threatened, you know, we've got to be careful about that too. Uh, we are talking about a completely different, uh, situation from what you describe, uh, um, in the sort of classic heights of the Cold Cold War. Um, and, um, it's, uh, it's, it's much more complex and the way the relationship is managed and understood it, there are so many layers to it and you know, game, you could spend ages talking about it at the plants that sort of stay in my mind, uh, our, um, the reality of economic power. And at the end of the day, you know, it goes back to that and, and uh, and China is clearly up there already and going to be even further ahead almost certainly in, in the period ahead.

John Scarlett:

[31:28](#)

The same time the reality of Chinese society, which is, I mean somebody said earlier on designing to do with communism, even though common his party is to do with authoritarianism, very tight control with massive use of changing technology to support it and understanding that, seeing what it means in practice day by day. Um, and then how do we sort of manage a, an effective, constructive, peaceful relationship with that is really complicated. But at the same time, not totally excluding the military point at all because those military issues potentially are there. We've touched on them in some questions. It's not like, you know, you'll describing, uh, sitting in shelters, um, in 1962 or whatever. Um, or maybe it was later than that, sorry. Um, that the, um, but you know, there are classic territorial issues, uh, south trying to see being one obvious one and uh, the Taiwan Straits, which may be quite historical, but I think maybe a deeper issue actually and the more emotional issue as far as Beijing is concerned. Uh, and so the risk of misunderstanding of a classic kind is certainly not going to go away. Uh, and so our thinking has to be at all those different levels. Um, but your basic point, you know from history is correct. Of course.

John McLaughlin:

[32:53](#)

Thank you. I don't have to add anything to that. Okay. Right here. Thank you.

Audience Member:

[33:02](#)

I'll be blunt. Do you think this president is going to destroy the Ili alliances that you took so long and hard to build that

everybody in this room is working long and hard to build? John McLaughlin?

John McLaughlin: [33:14](#) Um, they're in danger as the way I would put it. Um, I think there was confusion among the allies about who to believe in the United States. Uh, certainly a number of us go over and say, these alliances are strong, we're with you and so forth. Um, but all it takes is, uh, you know, a tweet or two and, and a, uh, they, they're confused about where are we really are. Uh, I think so. I don't think we're going to see them destroyed, but I think because of what we said earlier what I said, and I think everyone is saying, uh, alliances are as much about how you feel as about what you do. No, I could, I could cite a number of things that NATO is doing that are quite impressive on the ground, but I know from traveling around in Europe and talking to people that people don't feel close to us. They were, they were, don't just don't know where we are. So I would say they're in danger but not destroyed. Is that fair

John Scarlett: [34:28](#) a item? I picked that up. I mean, sorry to be boring because essentially we're saying the same thing. Um, it's, um, of course the headlines are the tweets and so on. Couldn't create a certain impression because they get used to the coverage and, uh, massive, uh, they go viral and so on. Uh, but um, at the same time you're underneath, uh, throughout our respective machines and governments and economies and goodness knows what else. Uh, there's just such fundamental linkage and it goes so deep, uh, that we have to remember that and not be distracted by the, you know, the prairie or overall, uh, the passing of headlines. Uh, that's the, um, that's the first point. The second point is I'd very much pick up, um, uh, this, uh, obviously it's very important that the leadership on all sides understand the value of the, of our, it's not just a line so long. This is probably not quite the right word. It's a deep relationship. Um, and perhaps they do really. Yeah. Um, and so it's important not to become too gloomy, but here's, here's

John McLaughlin: [35:38](#) a concrete danger though. Um, I, I've, I feel, I don't want to be too reassuring, but I also don't want to say it's over because we can't give up. Uh, if we neglect allies as we have in some cases and we do it long enough, they'll start to make their own arrangements. We see this by pulling out of the transpacific partnership, which was a foolish move on the part of the president, um, which involved, you know, many nations in Asia, uh, that would have been a wonderful platform from which to organize a, um, an understanding about how to deal with China. Well, many of the Asian nations have gone off now and started to make their own arrangements on trade and we're in a trade

war with China. So that's not how you, that's not how you make alliances prosper. Okay.

- Nick Burns: [36:31](#) I would just say that, um, the president has been heedless of Japan and South Korea. He's not treated them right. He's prioritized his relationships with Asian paying and Kim Jong on and on. NATO where I was ambassador for a Republican president, George W. Bush, he sees the European Union as a competitor and the president is a unilateralist. He believes the United States should act really alone in the world and he has been destructive of our lines. The biggest issue in Europe is the assault on democracy by the anti-democratic populous. The president has sided with Salvini, the fascist leader of illegal [inaudible] and with Viktor Orban, the authoritarian leader of Hungary and with the Polish government, and he's consistently sought to undermine angle Angela Merkel and Theresa May today he tweeted out against the mayor of London, he's the weakest American President we've ever had on the NATO alliance. And I can say he is the greatest threat to that alliance. Now we're getting, yeah, we're getting going now. I can say something that Sir John Kent [inaudible],
- John McLaughlin: [37:38](#) which is, I found it appalling that he insulted Theresa May terrible. Uh, given the reception that Theresa May gave him and his family in London, I found out appalling. No American president would ever do that, particularly when Theresa May is down on their luck, so to speak politically. You know, you just don't do that. So, um,
- Nick Burns: [38:03](#) we are out of time because we have to get you over to see Congressman Schiff, but um, they're going to be lots of time for questions there. Can I try to end on a high note? Today's a great day for America. My wife Libby and our two grandchildren and our daughter Sarah and son-in-law are preparing a Apollo 11 party. They sent me photos back in Westport, Massachusetts. What a great achievement. Apollo 11, the men and women of NASA. What a great achievement.
- Nick Burns: [38:38](#) Female and male engineers at NASA are astronauts. The incredible vision of President Kennedy, our military, everyone who produced Gemini and Apollo. It was one of the great achievements in the whole history of the country. And so I think the question for us to reflect upon from these three days, we are a great country and we can be and we can be great again. We can be great again. We need to be self confident about ourselves. Ambassador one of these security forms. This has been the most three days of the most stimulating, exciting and informative discussions. And thank you. Thank you.

Speaker 1: [39:23](#) So May, I think

Nick Burns: [39:25](#) all of our participants, everyone who spoke up here, who moderated a panel, all of the great journalists, we believe in the freedom of the press. The press is the friends of our democracy. Thank you to all of you who came and thank you to our great corporate sponsors. We wouldn't be here without them. They're all listed here. We'll see what the tent, uh, to see that great interview with Adam Schiff. Thank you very much. The final session will be at the Greenwald tent at 5:00 PM.