

## India's Geopolitical Moment?

Thursday, July 17, 2025 - 12:20 PM ET/10:20 AM MT

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### Speakers

- Shaurya Doval, Member Governing Council, India Foundation
  - Šumit Ganguly, Director, Huntington Program on Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, Hoover Institution, Stanford University
  - Sachin Pilot, Former Minister, Corporate Affairs, Telecom & Information Technology, Government of India; General Secretary, Indian National Congress
  - **Moderator:** Edward Luce, Financial Times
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### Luce

Thank You. Anja, a great pleasure to be here with you and also with this very distinguished panel. I used to be based in India for the Financial Times, 2001 to 2006 and I mention that because those were the years where India really sort of changed on the global stage. It had its nuclear tests in 1998 under the Vajpayee the previous BJP government. Then 911 happened, and that old Indian complaint that the United States hyphenated India with Pakistan, that's sort of withered away in successive administrations, from Clinton through Bush through Obama, Trump's first term, Biden really stuck to that idea that India, you know, is a power in its own right, and that we want India to succeed because it's The only real possible, natural counterbalance to China. There's no other conceivable country that could play that role. And so the United States practiced what I think one or two scholars have labeled strategic altruism. What is good for India will serve America's purposes. Now I mention that because in the last few weeks, as Anja in her introduction said, there was this India, Pakistan, four day war after a terrorist attack by a Pakistan link group in Kashmir and Trump. Donald Trump claims, I think, more than a dozen times now to have been the one who ended this war, and he's offered to mediate the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. And so in Indian minds, I think quite understandably, they're feeling there's a re-hyphenation going on, and you've had statements by the likes of Narendra Modi and Jaishankar, India's foreign minister, denying this. So I'm going to start with Shari. A question to you, Shari, and Shari is, you know, a good person who asked this question, not just in your own right. I mean, with your own think tank in Delhi, a fact that you're a member of the BJP, the ruling party. But I should also mention, you know your dad has been Ajti Doval has been Narendra Modi speech, long standing National Security Adviser I'm asking you, though, not to channel your dad's views. Has this? Has this caused Indians a little bit of angst, a little bit of sort of reappraisal of whether the United States is with them?

### Doval

Well, I think it has created a little bit of, let's say, at best, a bad taste in the mouth, because India had started perceiving its relationship with the United States as far more strategic. But we don't see that there is much substance in that. In the hyphenation of India versus Pakistan, they are

not too comparable entities. And therefore, while it may, in the short term, may suit American interests also to hyphenate the same. It's not, it's not a fair comparison. It's not a hyphenation that will stand the test of time and capabilities. So we just got to let it pass and get on with the job of India US strategic engagement on a medium to long term perspective.

### **Luce**

Okay. I mean, let me, let me pick up Sachin with you. And I'm really, I'm not going to go on mentioning famous fathers, but when I was based there, Sachin started Rajesh pilot, one of the rising stars of Indian politics, very tragically, died young, and Sachin is a rising star. Well, you've risen but you continue to rise in Indian politics, Congress Party, opposition, Congress. Sachin, Prime Minister Modi was there at the G7 in Canada. Trump had to leave early because of the Iran situation, but Trump said to Modi, with whom he had had a bilateral scheduled in Canada, please drop in via the White House on the way back. And Prime Minister Modi decided not to, and one of the reasons he decided not to is because Trump had scheduled a one to one lunch between him and Azim Munir, who is the head of the Pakistan army. And I just kind of, I cannot remember for the life of me, I think so. It tells me there is one other example, but I couldn't remember for the life of me, an instance where the United States President met with the head of the military of a foreign power, one to one. And so what did that do, in terms of the question I posed to Sharia, your sort of faith and trust in where US India relations are going under this administration?

### **Pilot**

Well, first of all, thank you very much for having me here. At the outset, let me just state that both India and the US have a relationship that is beyond one administration or one government. We have a long standing bilateral relations, and it suits both countries in terms of the values we espouse, the things we stand for, we fight for. That goes beyond a government, a leader or a administration, having said that, it's really not in my control, who the US president has lunch, breakfast or dinner with? That's, frankly, his choice. But in the context of what happened between India, Pakistan, some of you may not know this, but more than two dozen Indian tourists were killed in cold blood in front of their families by asking their name and religion, and then killed in cold blood now that for all us Indians, was a act of terror and an act of attack on the Indian Indian sovereignty and integrity. Now, while other nation states are big ones, have the right to respond. All right to do pre emptive strikes when they have quote, unquote credible evidences, I think we as a as a nation, as a country that believes in peaceful existence and democratic values, are within a right to respond adequately only at the terror infrastructures that exist documented exist. So we did what we had to do. I think the armed forces did a fantastic job. What happened post that, like you mentioned, Ed is very, very concerning, because President Trump, not just a dozen times, 14 times, has claimed that he was the one who got the cease fire done. In fact, for the first time ever us, President actually announced the ceasefire way before it had actually materialized. That raises many, many questions, but I think we stand our ground. The Indian people, the interest of our country remains foremost, and whatever may happen bilaterally between our neighbor and the US, that's pretty much up to them. We stand firm of what we believe, what's right for us, what we need to do, and we should proceed on that path.

**Luce**

Okay, Sumit, I'm sure you had a great father. Sorry, I can't complete the tryptic. Let me ask. I mean, you're based here, and therefore you're neither Congress nor BJP. You're a very eminent scholar now at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, Trump has offered, and this he did in his first term, at a meeting, I believe, with Imran Khan, who's now in jail in Pakistan. But Trump has offered, again, more recently and repeatedly, to mediate the conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, and I think perhaps misunderstanding or glossing over India's position which there will be no third party involvement or mediation. Do you think that this is something he's going to persist with? I mean, he is, you know, he sees himself as a great deal maker, and he sees a potential deal here. I mean, he did say the Kashmir disputes been going on for 1000s of years. It was 1947 I think that it began but, but that doesn't dampen his order to fix this and to be the third party mediator. Do you expect to see this as a thorn in India US relations?

**Ganguly**

Thank you, Ed, that's a vitally important question. Yes, I fear that this could become a thorn, especially if Trump persists in this vein. He does construe himself without much evidence, I might add that he's a great deal maker in international politics. I frankly, can't think of a single deal that has actually been consummated and that has actually produced meaningful results. Yes, there's the Abraham Accords, but those really have not addressed the fundamental issues that underlie the conflicts in the Middle East, they may be highly lucrative for certain individuals, but that does not address the fundamental problem that has long plagued the Middle East. And Trump continues to trumpet those Accords, but they really don't amount to very much. Nevertheless, he has this belief that he is a superb, deft, adroit negotiator, and he can miraculously solve the Indo Pakistani conflict. And as long as he persists along these lines, it will remain a bear in the saddle of Indian decision makers.

**Luce**

Okay, I want to sort of get later on into the India-China relations, because this is absolutely critical to us India relations. But let me just sort of ask widen the aperture a little bit. As I said at the beginning, you know, we've had successive US administrations, Republican and Democratic, wanting India to succeed. And part of that is to do with the sort of thrivingness of Indian Americans here in the United States. Part of it is to do with the fact that India is a democracy, a plural, very plural one. But a lot of that's got to do with China, with India being that counterweight to China, and therefore there's been quite a bit of forbearance from US administrations, including on trade. We have got, allegedly, a US India trade deal coming today. What would be Sharia? What would be your red lines? I mean, I know that the price of onions in India can bring down state governments. It can bring farmers under the streets. You know, we get, we get. You don't have a big soy production sector, so maybe there's some room there, but h 1b, visas, something that Trump's base do not like, but is really quite important to many, many Indians. What are your red lines for this deal? Does the Indonesia us deal or the Vietnam us deal? Give you any pointers and what do you expect to see, assuming we are imminently going to get a Trump India deal.

**Doval**

I think that you know first that this deal will, will will, if this deal ever happens, will actually not touch on, not be able to, not sort of negotiate its interest. Sorry for just getting a deal with the United States. That's very clear. India is just too big a power now and in economic weight of itself. That, you know, while I deal with America is desirable, if a deal doesn't happen, it's not the end of the world for India. There are certain red lines in India without these with this deal, particularly the agriculture sector. You know, India has 60% of its population, which still depends on agriculture. And there is just no way India will do a deal, I think, at least on the agriculture sector. If the trade off on that is the H-1B visas, yes, it will have some impact on the Indian diaspora and the sort of the educated Indians, but that politically is not a very relevant factor. So I don't think India will compromise on that. I think where India would look to do is to try and see if it can get a reasonably fair deal done with the United States in other areas. But I don't know what the US's negotiating position is if it's going to be very hard most on trying to force and, you know, sort of the US interests at any costs, then I think in India, they will find a very tough negotiator.

**Luce**

I mean, you don't, you don't. Sure, just to follow up. You don't, as Indians, have the same leverage that China has, right? China has this strangle hold on certain rare earths and critical minerals and the processing of them, and that has caused Trump to sort of climb down. You don't have any equivalent leverage.

**Doval**

But the corollary is that we, as a \$4 trillion economy, have, you know, our trade with the US is a very small percentage of the size of our economy. We're not essentially an export oriented economy. We're essentially a domestic economy, 4 trillion growing at about eight to 10% right? So while it's desirable for us to have a deal, but even if the United States and we don't have a deal, but have a deal, that will not in any meaningful way stop India's trajectory, unlike China, which is more dependent on the United States.

**Luce**

Okay, Sachin, I want to sort of get back to that. Azim Munir, Pakistan military chief. I know you don't want to discuss Trump's lunch arrangements, but it was extraordinary that the statement that came out afterwards from the Pakistanis and the Americans that they said they discuss cryptocurrency, it's like, first of all, I'm trying to get my head around Trump meeting with a military leader alone. Second, they discuss crypto currency. And I think that sort of gives an indication of what motivates some of these deals. How are you, as a prominent Indian politician, viewing the sort of the playing field here?

**Pilot**

I think it's changing very quickly, very rapidly, and the unpredictable nature of how things are evolving is a matter of concern. I don't want to speculate on the news reports about the Army Chief of Pakistan, meeting US president and talking about bitcoins and so on. That's probably speculation as of now. But what's far more remarkable is the fact that the US president was

having to deal with the chief of the army staff in Pakistan, not the elected government or its foreign minister or its prime minister. That tells you that for the last 75 years, India has actually worked really hard to preserve its democratic roots in that region. I won't take names, but not many nation states have a vibrant, functional democracy like we do. That is the reason why the army has so much leverage in most of our countries in the neighborhood, and that's why general Mooney was called for lunch and not the elected government of Pakistan. Enough said about that, but I'm more concerned about what's happening in our neighborhood, because it's very it's okay for the US to be concerned about adversaries, which are 8000 miles away, but the US is quite lucky in terms of his neighborhood. Some of them are friendly. Some are not willing to be bought out, and you have oceans on both sides, but India has a very different neighborhood, and we have to navigate that landscape on our own. Therefore, whatever we decide to do in terms of our internal security issues, our border issues, our foreign policy issues, our immediate neighborhood are singularly focused on protecting our own national interests, and like you said, to counterbalance the region as such, I think India has a pivotal role to play, irrespective of who's in government in the US and who's in government in India, because the post Second World War reality is what it is. And we have to recognize the fact that India houses 1/6 of humanity. We have a huge young population whose average age is 29 years, a lot of growth potential, and I think people want to be part and to be a stakeholder in that growth, so we don't anyone or anything to impede that growth trajectory. Therefore, I think it's, it's interest of everybody to work in a collaboration, to to actually work on the things that suit everybody, including global peace and regional security,

**Luce**

And do you see that happening?

**Pilot**

Not to its potential? I think there's always scope to improve. Like I said, the landscape is changing so quickly in the last six, eight months. I don't want to make predictions, but I'm just establishing what we as a country stand for and what we need to do with moving on in the future.

**Luce**

Okay, well, that neighborhood point, I think it was Henry Kissinger said, "India lives in a difficult neighborhood," right? And, I mean, I think a lot of Indians think that Kissinger didn't make it safer, but that's a whole different conversation. So this idea that I think Vajpayee and Bush Jr articulated, that the US and India were natural allies, and that therefore this is a long term thing. That's from administration to administration, from government, BJP, Congress, whatever. There is a consistency here. Are we still sort of confident that that is the trajectory?

**Ganguly**

Yes, I believe so, because during the Cold War, India and the United States really didn't have any meaningful relationship. There was no significant economic relationship because of India's autarkic economic policies, India pursued non alignment, sort of and was distrustful of the United States, largely because of its relationship with Pakistan, which had been forged as early

as 1954 so there was not much of a diplomatic relationship. And above all, there was no strategic relationship with the name, because India either manufactured weaponry on its own, or after 1971 became acutely dependent on the Soviet Union. Consequently, the relationship, as Hans Morgenthau, the great political scientists characterized it was a relationship of making faces at each other, and consequently it was of no substance. Today, it's a vastly different relationship. There's a significant and powerful Indian diaspora in this country. There is a meaningful economic relationship, admittedly, nothing like the US has with China, but nevertheless, it is a viable economic relationship. Thirdly, India, in the last two decades, has purchased over \$20 billion worth of military equipment, and not just garden variety military equipment, high technology military equipment from the United States. There are components of American aerospace equipment which are being manufactured in India today, the diplomatic relationship has undergone a fundamental transformation. And if there is a bipartisan consensus, both in India and here in the United States, that this relationship is of significance, and consequently, there will be hiccups in two democratic countries. Administrations will change. There'll be different prime ministers, different parties in power, and so there will be an ebb and flow, but I cannot see the relationship plummeting.

#### **Luce**

Okay, so let's sort of discuss BRICS for a moment, because India is a founding member with China of BRICS, and BRICS is expanding. I mean, whatever you think of BRICS, it's a popular club, and people keep knocking on the door. It's, you know, added new members. And Donald Trump recently said, If you join BRICS, we will consider that to be the act of an enemy. Now, I suspect Trump was referring to Mexico, the fear that Mexico might be considering joining BRICS. But one of the fears, I think, in the United States, personally, I think heavily overblown, is that BRICS creates an alternative to the dollar. Is there any conceivable circumstance any of you, but Shaurya first, where India and China would agree on an alternative currency?

#### **Doval**

So I think at least in the foreseeable future, the second for the next at least 2025, years, all analysis that you do, there is no risk to the dollar being replaced as a currency. It's just a professional fact, right? Because, you know, and the changes the amount of volume of trade, volume of investment that goes through. So we don't see the dollar being under threat by any wherever the dollar stands on its own strength as the reserve currency of the world. Having said that, you know, it is but fair for larger economies to come and find ways for them to be able to ease and lower the cost of transactions for the financial system. The very fact that the United States use the dollar as a way to, at times, to further its political interests, and, you know, and has used that as a kind of weapon, has created legitimate fears among nations across the world that this is indeed a reserve currency and a fair trading system. And therefore, either it is for the United States to politically outreach these countries and assure them that they will not use the dollar as a currency for political interest and and lay there, otherwise, some attempts will be made for nations to try and see what they can do in an eventuality that they are in a position where United States is using the dollar as a way of furthering their political interests.

#### **Luce**

I mean, there is an example right now. There's a bill going through the Senate. It's a bipartisan bill, Lindsey Graham and Senator Blumenthal, to give Trump a power to impose secondary sanctions, quite steep, 200, 300% on countries that buy sanctioned exports from Russia, notably oil and gas. And India is, of course, the largest customer, I believe, and it's cheap, and the Indians like cheap energy like anybody. What would that do if that bill goes through and India suddenly finds itself with 200% sanctions.

### **Doval**

Well, it's early to predict what India will do at that point in time. But as I said, that you know, as being articulated by successive Indian times, by the Indian Foreign Minister and Indian Government, India will act on its, solely on its, interests, for India's interest. So I think if India's interest still stack up, India will do what is the right thing for it to do. But I don't think it is fair for United States or to to pressurize the BRICS on the back of, you know, seeking the rise of seeing the BRICS as a way of, as a way of, you know, as a political sort of slug fest. The BRICS is an economic cooperation. If the United States wants to outpace the economic cooperation, as it has done in the past, it must do on the basis of its own economic brilliance, on its own economic rationale for the BRIC nations to be worried about not using the ability to trade or invest in America. But I think, of late, this is just this thing of using it as a political instrument. The only only further consolidate, not just BRICS, but more associations like the BRICS against the United States.

### **Luce**

Sachin?

### **Pilot**

I think it is pure fear mongering, because just take a step back. Post Second World War, the UN Security Council, NATO etc, institution based functioning of Global Affairs. But people who populate the earth, South America, Africa, India, don't have a face in the Security Council. This is the global reality. Now, if BRICS comes together as a platform, it's only a credible voice of the South, and nothing the BRICS has ever done which challenges anything that's of US interest. So I think it's fear mongering to talk about currency replacement, etc. I think that's coming anytime soon, but when the US forms multiple alliances, there was NAFTA earlier, a BRICS or a quad. We have a quad as well, right? So, there's a counterbalance to everything. But India, on its own, is becoming parts of many willing parties to come together to voice concern on climate change, on reducing inequality, on mitigating, you know, fossil fuel emissions, all these efforts need collaboration with willing minds, willing parties, willing countries. There's nothing wrong for India to be part of those institutions moving along. But like I said, you have to change institutional framework which has guided the world for the last 70 odd years. This is a new reality, and we cannot play the same game with old instruments and expect things to change. So if you have to move forward, we have to reform. We have to be accepting of the new reality and treat as partners people who are willing to work with you. So I don't think this BRICS threat of adding tariffs, it has a shelf life threatening restrictive tariffs and excise and blocking of free movement of trade and goods, that's what the US championed for 50 years. I think people across the globe benefited from it, but now we're seeing a whole reversal in that trend.

**Luce**

And I think it's fair to say so, is it not? And all of you will have views on this, that India's greatest fear is China, when we heard the bipartisan consensus in Washington, but it's here in Aspen, clearly, too, on that, on that subject of it's also America's greatest adversary and threat, this so called string of pearls around India's neck. There's this idea that China is encircling India. You have supports in Pakistan, you have, I guess, at the sort of naval the gem of the string of pearls Sri Lanka. China even owns a port in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, up to Nepal, Maldives all around India. China is developing closer military, not just, not just sort of maritime commercial, but actual military and naval and PLA relations with India's neighbor. And yet India, on the global stage, is very principled in terms of being non aligned, what we used to call non aligned during the Cold War, but believe it, in multi polarity in today's language, the Shanghai Cooperation Council, I mean BRICS, all of these, all of these groups are these just sort of symbolic for service, for what I mean, the real interest here is the natural alliance between the US and India, and therefore, whatever provocations or annoyances or irritations there are in the bilateral relationship, Trump, you know, the recent examples we've been talking About, you're going to put up with that, because the real threat here is China. Is that the correct reading?

**Ganguly**

In my judgment, yes, that is the correct reading. However, closer Indo US cooperation, particularly in the security realm, is hobbled by sort of the residual memories of the Cold War, there is still a level of lingering distrust in part of the Indian Foreign Policy elite about the reliability of the United States over the long term. Scholars of International Relations call this the fear of abandonment that the US could abandon India at a crucial moment. But unfortunately, in my view, as a scholar of diplomacy and International Relations, there is a kind of a selective memory in New Delhi, after all, who came to India's assistance in 1962 during the October war, when the US was also preoccupied with the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was the United States, not any other country, came Through with significant military assistance and subsequently carried out extraordinary intelligence cooperation with India, which persisted until the China opening under Kissinger, when it was finally terminated. And there is an extraordinary body of literature that has emerged which shows the level of this cooperation between India and the United States. So one needs to not only dwell on the shortcomings of the US as perceived from New Delhi during the Cold War, but also think about critical moments of cooperation. And even most recently, I have it on fairly good authority. And since I don't work for any government, being a university professor, I'm a free man, I can reveal that I have it on fairly good authority that US provided India with real time intelligence during the Galwan crisis of the spring of 2020.

**Luce**

And explain briefly, very quickly, what that was.

**Ganguly**

Yes, the Galwan crisis was took place when the PLA made a series of incursions across what is called the line of actual control, which is the de facto border between India and the PRC,



because it's a disputed border, and the dispute goes back to the 1950s and despite 22 rounds of discussions and negotiations, the progress has been genuinely glacial.

### **Luce**

Okay, and so, I mean, I want to get to questions a moment. There's only a few minutes left, but the fear of abandonment, point that you made summit and again, this is for all of you, the fear of abandonment that the US will abandon India. I think we can be pretty clear that regardless of what the optics and the mood music is, India will not abandon the United States, right? I mean, there is, there is no other possible sort of country that's going to come in, in that border conflict situation with China.

### **Pilot**

How do you base a good, mutually beneficial relationship on the basis of fear? I don't agree with Sumit this abandonment issue. I mean, who's abandoning who we are doing, what we are doing, us living what it's doing. Our interests align the counterweight and the containment of what you said of China is not just one country, one government, one geography. It has to be it has to be done in a conducive environment, in a collaborative environment. And I think a point I want to make about the US, I think what we need to do more is more data sharing, more counter intelligence, data sharing, real time, data sharing and being able to help each other and things that we need to do so that we are able to do and achieve our common aims and objective. China is our neighbor. It's our largest trading partner. We have border issues and serious funds. We still have a relationship that cannot be wished away. So we have the most to gain and lose when it comes to counterbalance and counter. You know, containment issues. And like you mentioned, China is doing that. The encircling, it's, you know, it's death by 1000 Cuts. So that's something that bothers us much more than bothers the US. So I don't think this issue of abandoning each other, it has to be more realigned and more constructive cooperation.

### **Luce**

I didn't bring up abandonment. Just, just want to, very briefly, sure, what is it that India wants from the United States? I know what you're talking about now. You have to talk about it. You didn't really want to be talking about it. Anja mentioned in the introduction that this four day conflict between India and Pakistan in May? You know, but that, but that was China, enabled a lot of, a lot of the Pakistani military repost, and the clash this was with Chinese military technology, right, which is integrated, what would you want to be actually talking about with the US administration?

### **Doval**

Now, I think, before I answer the question that I'd like to say that, you know, from India's perspective, you know, we talked about Kissinger and before that, I think it'd be great if the United States and India have a long tradition of shared values and their natural allies. I think the United States consistency in not letting the values be violated for tactical interests. That has been, there have been elements of that with the US. Is foreign policy outreach over the years. You know, which is, which does create a certain amount of circumspect behavior within the establishment that you know, for some tactical interest, will the United States abdicate its long

term, value driven policy will remain a matter of concern. And this incident about in, you know, in in, in was one such example. And you talked about subsequent lunch with the the Pakistani chief, is such a rightly pointed out, there was an act of terror clearly defined. We both agree that, we both agree that terrorism cannot be taken as as just lying low, and therefore it must be repulsed, and you must go and find the source of terror and do exactly what India did was to try neutralize the terror threat where and wherever it remains, because terrorism is something that is not a fair way of extending state policy. So to that extent, then when you do something which may be in the tactical interest and tactical interest may justify it. I think it creates a situation where you start asking the fundamental question that you know, what is more important is to fight against Darren Morris, important or your own tactical interest more important?

**Luce**

Okay, we've got time for a couple of quick questions. The gentleman there in the white shirt and just sort of a staccato machine gun, yeah, absolutely.

**Krishna Gall**

Thank you so much. Appreciate the panel. My name is Krishna Gall. I work here at UBS in DC, so my question is a little bit of a tough one. So obviously, Canada has recently released reports about the assassination, or alleged assassination, of Khalistan nationalists in Canada. I was wondering if the panel could touch upon that. Thank you.

**Luce**

Who would, who would like to take this classic question? Sumit?

**Ganguly**

Sure, I have the least to lose. Yes, there have been a series of allegations and charges about Indian complicity in the killing of this separatist the Khalistan movement is a movement for the creation of a separate state which is predominantly sick people who belong to the Faith. But that movement, for the most part, has collapsed. It enjoys support in the Sikh diaspora in various parts of the world, but within India, it's only the dying embers of the movement that exist. In fairness, I have no idea the extent to which the Indian government was complicit or not. I cannot comment on that with any authority, but I will say that the Canadian government, particularly under Trudeau, was oblivious to repeated Indian expressions of concerns about the existence of this movement, some of whom are actually involved in criminal activity to support their work and to try and foment this movement again in India, and consequently that had strained relations. But I cannot comment with any authority on the extent of or the actual complicity of the Indian government in killing

**Luce**

Yes here, and quite sort of brief.

**Audience Member**

India avoided condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Abstain from votes within the UN if you think so, how do you think this affects India's credibility as a US partner in the so called rules based order?

**Luce**

Sachin?

**Pilot**

Well, we took a very clear stand. We don't stand for violence against war, and we call for cease fire and peace. Beyond that, we haven't interfered in the global platforms. Whatever the US may have done. New York may have done, but we are very clearly for peace and against any violence. And look at you learn the most about the future from the past, from our own standpoint, India has never been an aggressor, so we don't believe in aggressive policies.

**Luce**

Well, we've got 10 seconds. Somebody have like, a two word question here, yeah, and a one word answer again.

**Audience Member**

Can you comment briefly on the European EU, Indian relationship, also in light of India as a counterweight, maybe for China?

**Doval**

Not a thirty second answer, but I'll try my best. Look, the European Union, I think, is also grappling with the new reality. They have many challenges, economic, demographic, and I think the outreach from India is substantial. We hope to have more collaboration. And I don't think we should think about India, Europe, European relationship only with the context of China. I think everything doesn't move around China. We have our own mutually beneficial relationship that we must foster and deepen clearly, but I think India is very, very keen as a country to explore, to deepen, people to people, contacts, economy, technology, all of that. But it shouldn't really be viewed with the prism only of containment and accountable counter balance in China. But I think Europeans, you make a movie more than halfway.

**Luce**

That's a good high note on which to end a very complicated but overlooked, important subject that you've done a great job.